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JUDGING POVERTY: USING INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW TO REFINE THE SCOPE
OF CHARTER RIGHTS
BRUCE PORTER*
RtSUM#t
Au cours des derni~res ann6es, un consensus a fait surface au sein des organes de
d6fense des droits cr6s en vertu d'instruments internationaux A l'effet que la pauvret6
chez les groupes vuln6rables au Canada constitue une atteinte s6rieuse aux droits de
la personne. Le processus d'examen du Comit6 des droits 6conomiques, sociaux et
culturels a entrain6 une nouvelle faqon de comprendre la n~cessit6 d'6tablir des
proc6d~s juridictionnels et une participation r6elle des personnes dont les droits
sociaux et 6conomiques sont en jeu. Les organes de d6fense des droits cr6s en vertu
d'instruments internationaux ont soulign6 combien il est important que les interpr6-
tations de la Charte canadienne des droits et liberts faites par les cours canadiennes
reconnaissent les droits fondamentaux contenus dans les trait~s internationaux des droits
de la personne, notamment le droit A une alimentation, A des vetements et A un logement
appropri~s.
Une telle reorientation de la port~e des droits proteges par la Charte est-elle possible
au Canada? L'auteur avance que la responsabilit6 fondamentale des cours et des
tribunaux de reconnaltre les d6fis poses par la pauvret6 et l'itinrance en tant que
revendications l~gitimes pour des raisons de dignitY, d'6galit6 et de s~curit6 en vertu
de la Charte d~coule de la nouvelle jurisprudence relative i la Charte. Les revendications
des droits de la personne faites par les personnes pauvres au Canada, qui ont commenc6
A faire l'objet de procis &quitables A l'6chelle internationale pendant les annes 1990,
doivent maintenant tre entendues par les tribunaux et les cours au Canada.
La Cour supreme du Canada a affirm6 que le droit international des droits de la
personne aura une influence d~terminante dans '6tablissement de la port~e des droits
pr6vus par la Charte, notamment du droit ! la vie, A la libert6 et A la s~curit: de la
personne d~crits A 'article 7 de la Charte, et des droits A '6galit6 d~crits k l'article
15. Bien que la Cour ait fait preuve de prudence relativement A l'usurpation du r6le
lgislatif dans les programmes sociaux et 6conomiques, elle a reconnu qu'il revient
aux cours de determiner si les choix et les programmes portant sur les politiques
16gislatives respectent les valeurs d~mocratiques fondamentales reli~es aux normes
internationales des droits de la personne. L'incorporation des droits sociaux et 6cono-
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miques dans l'interpr~tation de la Charte ne revient pas h empi~ter sur le pouvoir
16gislatif. Elle consiste plut6t A reconnaitre les revendications l6gitimes h la dignit6,
A l'6galit6 et A la s~curit6 des groupes les plus vuln~rables et h mieux concentrer la
vision des cours sur les domaines qui constituent, tant pour la communaut6 inter-
nationale que pour les Canadiens eux-m~mes, des questions cruciales. Comme c'est le
cas pour l'utilisation traditionnelle du terme o port6e >> dans 1'interpr6tation textuelle,
les cours doivent s'assurer que le sens d6taill de la Charte dans les domaines sociaux
et 6conomiques demeure fiddle A son objectif central. Les droits sociaux et 6conomi-
ques devraient constituer un point de r6f6rence crucial pour les valeurs et les motifs
qui sous-tendent l'interpr6tation de la Charte.
INTRODUCTION: POVERTY AND THE CRISIS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CANADA
Over the last few years, a consensus has emerged among human rights treaty moni-
toring bodies reviewing Canada's compliance with its international human rights
obligations that there is a serious and growing gap between the human rights to which
Canada has committed under international law and the domestic policies and actions
of governments in Canada.' Ironically, it is primarily in the social and economic
domain that the country at the top of the United Nations Development Programme's
Human Development Index2 has been found to be violating the fundamental human
rights of its most vulnerable citizens. The emerging consensus at the international level
is that poverty among vulnerable groups in Canada constitutes a serious breach of
human rights obligations. A more major concern in the long run is that our approach
to human rights in Canada leaves us incapable of addressing it.
Poverty has been defined in Canadian political and judicial culture as a problem of
social policy within the preserve of legislatures and social policy advisors to solve. It
has not, as yet, been incorporated into our domestic human rights framework -
primarily defined by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms3 (the Charter)
and human rights legislation - as a human rights issue of the highest order. That,
however, is how it is articulated in international human rights law emerging from the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which lists a number of social and economic
rights among its fundamental human rights, including the right to an adequate standard
of living, including food, clothing and housing.4
1. Infra, parts 2 and 3.
2. See, for instance, United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report, 1997
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
3. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 1
[hereinafter Charter].
4. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217(111) UN GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 13, UN
Doc. A/810 (1948) 71, art. 25.
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The exclusion of issues of poverty among vulnerable groups from domestic rights
adjudication has created a growing gulf between Canada's human rights culture and
the international human rights movement. Further, the inability or unwillingness of
our courts and human rights institutions to address poverty seems to have created a
political and cultural paralysis in the face of levels of homelessness and destitution
which most agree are incompatible with the fundamental values of Canadian society.5
Contrary to what critics of rights strategies suggest, the exclusion of issues of poverty
from our domestic human rights and constitutional framework has not meant that poor
people rely on legislatures and parliament rather than on courts and human rights
institutions to have their concerns addressed. Rather, the exclusion of their fundamen-
tal human rights from Canada's domestic rights framework has meant that poor
people's rights have been increasingly marginalized in both political and judicial fora,
falling between the institutional cracks of our relatively new constitutional democracy.
Directions from international human rights treaty monitoring bodies have been clear
and unequivocal. Courts in Canada need to interpret and apply the rights in the Charter
in a manner that recognizes the interdependence and indivisibility of all human rights
and to bring within its scope critical issues of poverty and homelessness among
vulnerable groups. This means that social and economic rights such as the right to an
adequate standard of living, including adequate food, clothing and housing, must be
recognized as rights which can be claimed and adjudicated by way of existing Charter
rights, as well as through other areas of law. 6 It also means recognizing the important
place those living in poverty must play in bringing social and economic rights claims
forward, challenging the systemic causes of poverty and claiming their constitutional
rights to dignity, equality and security. Is such a reorientation of the scope of Charter
rights possible in Canada? The present article will argue that emerging Charter and
international human rights jurisprudence makes it a fundamental responsibility of
courts and tribunals to address social and economic rights claims as legitimate Charter
claims.
Bringing poverty issues into our domestic human rights framework in Canada will
require more than a refined approach to Charter rights, of course. As Craig Scott has
observed, a "judicial transformation" which absorbs international human rights norms
must be part of a broader transformation of Canadian politics and human rights
culture.7 There are other avenues of important legislative and institutional reform
which must be pursued along with a new approach to Charter rights.8 International
5. For a discussion of the value that Canadian society places on social and economic well-being, see M.
Jackman, "The Protection of Welfare Rights Under the Charter" (1988) 20 Ottawa L. Rev. 257, part
1; see also B. Porter, "Social Rights and the Question of a Social Charter," in P. Leduc Browne ed.,
Finding Our Collective Voice, Options for a New Social Union (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy
Alternatives, 1998) 59.
6. For discussion of the recommendations of U.N. bodies with respect to domestic remedies, see infra,
part 3; see also C. Scott, "Canada's International Human Rights Obligations and Disadvantaged
Members of Society: Finally into the Spotlight?" (1999) 10:4 Constitutional Forum 97 at 104.
7. Ibid. at ll l.
8. Ibid.
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human rights treaty monitoring bodies have recommended adding social and economic
rights to the Canadian Human Rights Act 9 (CHRA) as well as to provincial human
rights legislation. This recommendation has been endorsed by the Canadian Human
Rights CommissionlO and the majority of human rights groups across Canada.11 A
panel charged with reviewing the CHRA, headed by the Honourable G6rard La Forest,
former Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, has been holding consultations with
respect to, among other things, "the adequacy of the scope and jurisdiction of the
Act." 12 Public consultations across Canada have discovered an emerging domestic
consensus parallel to the international consensus, that traditional approaches to human
rights in Canada which exclude poverty and social and economic rights must be
reformed. 13 There is broad support for a new vision of human rights which affirms
the connection between domestic and international human rights protections and
includes social and economic rights in the CHRA.
A previous article, written by Martha Jackman and myself, outlines proposals for the
inclusion of social and economic rights within an amended CHRA. 14 We argue there
for an integrated approach to the interpretation of human rights legislation and the
Charter which would affirm the fundamental place of social and economic rights in
both, and which would make the provisions of international human rights law their
common reference point.
In the present article, I revisit the issue of claiming and adjudicating social and
economic rights under the Charter. I review the emerging international human rights
jurisprudence and the concerns and recommendations of U.N. human rights treaty
monitoring bodies with respect to Canada, considering how these can be integrated
with domestic Charter jurisprudence. It is in the context of Charter interpretation that
9. R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6.
10. Canadian Human Rights Commission, Annual Report 1997 (Ottawa: Canadian Human Rights Com-
mission, 1998) 2.
11. Among the organizations supporting the inclusion of social and economic rights are the Charter
Committee on Poverty Issues (CCPI), the National Anti-Poverty Organization (NAPO), Equality for
Gays and Lesbians Everywhere (EGALE), The African Canadian Legal Clinic, Action travail des
femmes, La table f~ministe de concertation provinciale de L'Ontario, the National Association of
Women and the Law (NAWL), the Council of Canadians with Disabilities (CCD), Coalition of
Persons with Disabilities (Newfoundland and Labrador) and Independent Living Resource Centre
(St. John's, Newfoundland), Metro Toronto Chinese & Southeast Asian Legal Clinic, Affiliation of
Multicultural Societies & Service Agencies of B.C. (AMSSA) and the Canadian Council for Refu-
gees (CCR). Submissions to the Canadian Human Rights Act Review Panel, on file with the Panel.
12. Canadian Human Rights Act Review Panel: Terms of Reference, online: <www.chrareview.org>.
13. See Summaries of Non-Governmental Organizations Roundtable Consultations, Halifax, September
28th and 29th, 1999; Montrdal, September 30/October 1, 1999; Ottawa, October 18th and 19th,
1999; Toronto, October 20th and 21st, 1999; Vancouver, October 25th and 26th, 1999; Edmonton,
October 27th and 28th, 1999, online: <www.chrareview.org>.
14. M. Jackman and B. Porter, "Women's Substantive Equality and the Protection of Social and Eco-
nomic Rights under the Canadian Human Rights Act" in Status of Women Canada, Women and the
Canadian Human Rights Act: A Collection of Policy Research Reports (Ottawa: Status of Women
Canada, 1999) available online: <www.swc-cfc.gc.ca>.
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the courts have considered important issues related to the adjudication of social and
economic rights claims - the relationship between domestic and international human
rights law; the role of courts and tribunals in adjudicating "positive rights" claims;
judicial competence to adjudicate claims in the social and economic domain; and the
distinction between social policy issues and human rights issues which has tended to
exclude poverty from the scope of human rights and Charter adjudication in Canada.
These are the issues which we must re-think in Canada if we are to bring poverty issues
properly within the scope of domestic approaches to human rights. 15
In part I, I consider how'emerging trends in international human rights law have come
to give a more prominent place to social and economic rights violations in affluent
countries such as Canada than was previously the case. I consider how the review
procedures at the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights have created a
new understanding that these rights need more than "expert review" - that they need
adjudicative procedures based on effective participation by those whose rights are at
stake.
In part II, I review the consensus among the most prominent U.N. human rights treaty
monitoring bodies about the most critical substantive violations of human rights in
Canada. I show that these are primarily linked with poverty and the failure of
governments in Canada to meet substantive obligations toward vulnerable groups. I
consider what this emerging human rights framework for poverty issues at the
international level has meant to poor people in Canada. I contrast their experience of
the human rights framework at the international level with the reception of the U.N.
treaty monitoring bodies' reports back in Canada, where they have been generally
allocated to the field of "social policy review" rather than being understood as findings
of violations of fundamental human rights.
In part III, I consider the reviews by the treaty monitoring bodies of how well Canada's
domestic legal order conforms with international human rights obligations to provide
effective domestic remedies to violations of human rights, and their recommendations
as to what we need to do to transform our domestic approach to human rights into one
which is consistent with international human rights norms.
In part IV, I consider how the recommendations for reorientation of Charter interpre-
tation fit with developments in Charter jurisprudence. I argue that the recommenda-
tions of treaty monitoring bodies for more effective adjudication of social and
economic rights by way of the Charter are consistent with recent Supreme Court
jurisprudence. I argue that incorporating social and economic rights into Charter
interpretation is not a matter of dramatically expanding the role of tribunals and courts
in Canada. Rather, it is a matter of better focusing their gaze on the areas where both
the international community and Canadians themselves find the most critical human
rights issues, and applying recognized principles of Charter interpretation to the
Charter claims of poor people to dignity, security and equality.
15. Infra, part 4.
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I. THE EMERGENCE OF MORE EFFECTIVE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
RIGHTS REVIEW OF CANADA WITHIN THE U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATY MONITORING SYSTEM
The fact that Canada is no longer seen by the international human rights community
as the promised land of human rights compliance has only recently become apparent.
The Canadian government has still not fully comprehended what happened or why.' 6
How did Canada, a darling of the international human rights community, come to be
identified as a violator of human rights in reviews of its compliance with international
human rights treaties?
The most obvious cause for the emerging critique, of course, is what has been
occurring domestically within Canadian social policy. The 1990s saw a systematic
attack on the protection of and respect for social and economic rights within many of
the world's most affluent countries and within new global economic arrangements.
These retrogressive developments have been particularly dramatic in Canada. The
treaty monitoring reviews of Canada in the 1990s found clear evidence of a dramatic
erosion of both legislative and programmatic adherence to social entitlements linked
to the right to an adequate standard of living in Canada. 17
Canada has been at the leading edge of, and much affected by, global trends toward
free trade and government withdrawals from previously assumed roles in protecting
social and economic rights. Unlike the U.S., however, which leads these global
economic developments, we have ratified the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rightsl8 (ICESCR) and thus have unequivocally affirmed social
and economic rights under international human rights law. On the other hand, our
approach to domestic human rights protections has not incorporated this fundamental
difference and has tended to conform more to a U.S. style rights regime in which social
and economic rights have been accorded little recognition. Non-governmental orga-
nizations (NGOs) representing poor people in Canada have thus turned increasingly
to international human rights law and its review procedures for a framework of human
rights which more closely conforms with what poor people consider fundamental
human rights protections. Here is a human rights framework that is capable of
acknowledging the serious attack on fundamental rights that has accompanied the
dramatic political and economic changes of recent years.
The reviews of Canada for compliance with U.N. human rights treaties have thus
become important occasions for confronting the growing gap between the interna-
tional human rights commitments of affluent countries like Canada (the majority,
unlike the U.S., recognize social and economic rights under international law) and
16. For a description of Canadian government reactions to the emerging criticism from international
human rights bodies, see C. Scott, supra note 6.
17. Infra, quotation accompanying note 46.
18. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 993 U.N.T.S.
3, Can. T.S. 1976 No. 46 (entered into force 3 January 1976, accession by Canada 19 August 1976)
[hereinafter ICESCRI.
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their domestic performance. These reviews have also played an important part in the
development of the jurisprudence of the treaty monitoring bodies as they have been
challenged to come to grips with emerging problems in Canada and elsewhere linked
with the new global developments threatening social and economic rights. Two
developments in particular were important in the Canadian context: the development
of an "adjudicative" model of assessing compliance with social and economic rights,
and the development of a more rigorous approach to the obligations surrounding the
''progressive realization" of social and economic rights in affluent countries.
A. Developing an Adjudicative Model for Assessing Compliance with
Social and Economic Rights
While poor people in Canada now place considerable weight on the protections of
social and economic rights in international human rights law, this was not always the
case. It is at the international level, of course, that the bifurcation of social and
economic rights from civil and political rights first occurred. Cold war rhetoric and
an aggressive campaign by the U.S. against the recognition of social and economic
rights 19 led to the separation of what was originally a unified conception of rights in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights into two separate Covenants, the ICESCR
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights20 (ICCPR). Both Cove-
nants affirm, in their preambles, the interdependence of civil, political, economic,
social and cultural rights and there is no explicit differentiation in either Covenant
with respect to whether the rights they contain are amenable to adjudication. Never-
theless, the two sets of rights were often distinguished in the first years of the
Covenants on the basis that social and economic rights were somehow not amenable
to adjudication, findings of violations or effective legal remedies.
An Optional Protocol establishing an individual complaints procedure for civil and
political rights was adopted in 1966 along with the ICCPR and came into force with
the Covenant in 1976.21 No similar provision was adopted for the ICESCR. The U.N.
Human Rights Committee (HRC) was created under the ICCPR to receive and review
19. The U.S. opposition to social and economic rights continues to this day and is an important subtext
to the interplay, in Canadian courts, between the American rights paradigm and an emerging interna-
tional consensus in favour of giving equal recognition to social and economic rights. The U.S. has
not only refused to ratify the ICESCR but stubbornly remains one of only two countries to refuse to
ratify the Convention on the Rights of the Child (see, infra, note 33). (Somalia is the other country
not to have ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child in large part because of political
instability). For a review of the U.S. response to social and economic rights see P. Alston, "U.S.
Ratification of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Need for an Entirely
New Strategy" (1990) 84 A.J.I.L. 365.
20. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, Can.
T.S. 1976 No. 47 (entered into force 23 March 1976, accession by Canada 19 May 1976) [hereinafter
ICCPR]. For an overview of the bifurcation of these Covenants, see M. Craven, The International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on its Development (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1995).
21. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (First) Optional Protocol, Adopted Dec. 19,
1966 999 U.N.T.S. 302 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
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periodic reports from State parties and also to receive and decide on complaints. The
review. of compliance with the ICESCR, on the other hand, was assigned to a variety
of ineffective expert "working groups" appointed by the U.N. Economic and Social
Council in the early years of the Covenant. The result of this institutional differentia-
tion between the two Covenants at the international level was that for many years the
United Nations treaty monitoring system provided an evolving experience and juris-
prudence on the adjudication of civil and political rights but provided nothing com-
parable for social and economic rights.
Even after the formation of the current U.N. Committee on Economic Social and
Cultural Rights (CESCR) to supervise state compliance with the ICESCR, social and
economic rights continued to be weighed down by an exclusive reliance on expert
review rather than adjudication. State parties submitted periodic reports at intervals
of five years or so, and the Committee of 18 experts then engaged in a dialogue with
delegations of the State parties with respect to compliance with the Covenant. The
dialogue was predictably stultified. Governments like Canada submitted lengthy
documentation of all of their accomplishments and the Committee was hamstrung by
the one sided nature of the information before it.22 The first periodic review of Canada
by the new CESCR in 1988 had little impact domestically.
In 1993, with Canada's Second Periodic Report coming up for review, Canadian NGOs
decided to challenge the "expert review" paradigm. Despite advice from international
NGOs that we would never succeed, the Charter Committee on Poverty Issues (CCPI)
petitioned the Committee for a new procedure through which it would hear oral
submissions from domestic NGOs as part of the consideration of States' periodic
reports. The request, surprisingly enough, caught the imagination of the Chairperson,
Philip Alston, who used the request to provoke a review of Committee procedures.
With Canada's somewhat apprehensive agreement, the Committee decided to set aside
time at the beginning of the session for NGO presentations relating to periodic
reports. 23 As the Committee notes on its official "Fact Sheet", this was the first time
a human rights treaty monitoring body at the United Nations permitted domestic NGOs
to appear in the context of periodic reviews of State party compliance and has since
22. For an overview of the role of the Committee and the implementation measures under the ICESCR
prior to 1993 see P. Alston & J.J. Quinn, "The Nature and Scope of States Parties' Obligations Under
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" (1987) 9 Human Rights Quar-
terly 156; P. Alston, "The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" in P. Alston, ed.,
The United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) 473.
23. Sarah Sharpe, a low income activist from St. John's, and I appeared before the Committee on behalf
of CCPI and the National Anti-Poverty Organization on May, 16 1993 for a forty-five minute oral
presentation, backed up with a written brief and a slide show. See S. Sharpe 'Taking Canadian
Poverty Issues to the U.N." NAPO News No. 40 at 1; See also The Right to an Adequate Standard of
Living in a Land of Plenty: Submissions by the Charter Committee on Poverty Issues and the
National Anti-Poverty Organization to the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights to the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the
Occasion of Canada's Second Periodic Review Under the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (May, 1993), available online: <www.web.net/ccpi> [hereinafter Right to
An Adequate Standard of Living in a Land of Plenty].
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been used by NGOs in many other countries as a critical means for bringing to light
violations of social and economic rights. 24
The result of the CESCR's innovation in 1993 was that economic, social and cultural
rights became subject to what international human rights scholar Mathew Craven calls
an "unofficial petition procedure." 25 The submission and review of State party reports,
previously the essence of the review process, is now only the beginning of a review
procedure that is fundamentally adjudicative in nature. Ironically, the absence of an
optional protocol for individual complaints of violations of social and economic rights
has led the CESCR to lead the way in developing an adjudicative model for systemic
social and economic rights claims.
Rather than presuming to an expertise in the complex social and economic issues in
each country under review, the CESCR has recognized that it functions most compe-
tently when it facilitates what amounts to a hearing - considering allegations of
non-compliance advanced by domestic groups and then considering "responses" from
governments. Admittedly, this is not always possible. It depends on the ability of
domestic NGOs to participate effectively in the review process. This requires, at a
minimum, resources, an ability to leave the country, and freedom to participate without
reprisals from government. Where such participation is possible, however, the Com-
mittee relies on the NGOs to identify the most critical issues regarding the implementa-
tion of the Covenant and to provide the necessary background for members to put
these issues to government delegates for a response. NGO briefs, to be effective, need
to provide well documented evidence in the nature of "amicus briefs" filed in domestic
judicial proceedings. In cases where domestic NGOs are not able to participate,
international human rights NGOs will frequently step in.
Under the CESCR's procedure, the Periodic Report is required to provide evidence
on particular issues of compliance, for example, the availability of domestic legal
remedies and the situation of identified vulnerable groups.26 After the Report has been
received and a review scheduled, a pre-sessional working group convenes six months
prior to the review to consider the report and develop a list of issues or questions to
send to the State party. This is one of the most important and frequently overlooked
components of the Committee review process for both NGOs and governments -
analogous to a pre-hearing in a judicial setting to identify critical issues in dispute.
NGOs are permitted brief oral submissions and may submit written briefs to the
pre-sessional working group. Without effective NGO submissions to the pre-sessional
24. United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Fact Sheet, online:
<www.unhcr.ch/html/menu6/2/fsl 6.htm>.
25. M. Craven 'Towards an Unofficial Petition Procedure: A Review on the Role of the UN Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" in K. Drzewicki, C. Krause and A. Rosas eds., Social
Rights as Human Rights: A European Challenge (London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1994) 91.
26. United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Revised Guidelines Regarding
the Form and Contents of Reports to be Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 17 June 1991, U.N. Doc.
E/C. 12/1989/SR.8 at part B article 11 [hereinafter Reporting Guidelines].
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working group the committee would have little sense of the primary issues of
importance. The list of issues also provides governments with a first opportunity to
respond, in writing, to concerns or allegations of non-compliance. This is the
government's opportunity to put its pleadings on the record.27
Five months or so after the list of issues is sent to the government, the actual review
occurs before the Committee. The review affords NGOs an opportunity to appear
briefly before the Committee and to present by way of written and oral submissions
their concerns and evidence with respect to non-compliance with the Covenant. The
Committee ensures that copies of all NGO submissions are provided to the government
delegation in advance of its appearance before the Committee and government repre-
sentatives attend the NGO oral submissions. The Committee's questioning of the
government delegation focuses on concerns or questions raised in the government's
response to the list of issues, concerns raised by NGOs and concerns of Committee
members themselves. 28 Concluding Observations are then prepared by the Committee
in closed door sessions, based on the outcome of the review process. These Observa-
tions will not comment on any issue which has not properly been put to the government
for a response.
Lacking a jurisprudence arising from an individual complaints procedure but never-
theless required to issue authoritative considerations of compliance with fundamental
human rights, the Committee has adopted an adjudicative framework that has affected
both the competency and legitimacy of its review process. Experts from 18 different
countries sitting as part-time Committee members would have little competence to
assess compliance with social and economic rights in Canada and other countries
without the participatory, adjudicative procedures the CESCR has developed. Indeed,
many of the members of the Committee are legal scholars or appellate judges in their own
countries, so their expertise is less a social policy expertise than an adjudicative one.
The development of an adjudicative process has given more legitimacy to the
Committee's human rights review as well. Democratic societies are properly cautious
about authorizing experts to make findings of violations of human rights outside the
27. For the results of this process with respect to Canada, see Committee on Economic, Social And
Cultural Rights, Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, List of issues to be taken up in connection with the consideration of the third periodic report
of Canada concerning the rights referred to in articles 1-15 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (E/1994/104/Add.17) E/C.12/Q/CAN/I (10 June 1998), para-
graph 8, page 2 [hereinafter List of Issues]. Review of Canada's Third Report on The Implementation
of The International Covenant on Economic, Social And Cultural Rights: Responses to the supple-
mentary questions emitted by the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (E/C/12/Q/CAN/1) on Canada's third report on the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (E/1994/104/Add17) [hereinafter Responses to Supplementary Ques-
tions]. These are available at the U.N. website and also at the Canadian NGO website, along with the
NGO submissions, online: <www.web.net/ngoun98>.
28. For description of this process in the context of the review of Canada, see B. Porter, "Socio-eco-
nomic Rights Advocacy - Using International Law: Notes from Canada" (July 1999) 2:1 Economic
& Social Rights Review 1.
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context of participatory rights and procedural fairness to parties concerned - both the
constituencies whose rights may have been infringed and those accused of infringing
them. To the extent that the public and parliament see a social and economic rights
review process, either at a domestic or international level, as a group of "experts"
trying to dictate social policy to Canadians, social and economic rights will be seen
as illegitimate incursions into democratic decision-making. It is only if there is a fair
and competent adjudicative process and full participation from interested parties and
constituencies that the public and parliamentarians can legitimately be asked to
incorporate findings of human rights infringements into the democratic process.
In response to support from the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights for
continued work by the CESCR in developing an optional protocol for petitions under
the Covenant, the Committee has adopted a draft.29 It has not as yet received necessary
support from governments. Nevertheless, the transformation of the CESCR in the last
decade from a largely irrelevant expert review mechanism to an influential human
rights adjudication procedure has been of fundamental importance in allowing the
international human rights community to leave behind the sterile debates about the
justiciability of social and economic rights which dominated the earlier years. The
CESCR has developed a practice which establishes that these rights can be adjudicated
with both competency and legitimacy. 30
B. Adjudicating Progressive Realization and the Allocation of Resources
at the CESCR
As well as benefiting from an institutional shift toward an adjudication model of social
and economic rights review at the CESCR, constituencies seeking more effective
adjudication of social and economic rights in Canada also benefited during the 1990s
from a new willingness on the part of the CESCR to subject affluent countries to a
more meaningful review than had occurred in previous years.
There has traditionally been a strong institutional bias within the U.N. human rights
system in favour of U.S. and northern rights paradigms. Many of the international
human rights NGOs are funded by U.S. based charities to do work in developing
29. Report of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the subject (E/CN.4/1997/105)
was submitted for consideration by the Commission on Human Rights at its 53rd session held in
Geneva, from 17 March to 25 April 1997. For discussion of this issue, see F. Coomans and G. J. H.
van Hoof, eds., The Right to Complain about Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Proceedings (of
the Expert Meeting on the Adoption of an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Utrecht, 25-28 January 1995) (Utrecht, Netherlands Institute
of Human Rights, 1995); United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Fact
Sheet, supra note 24.
30. For a development of this theme see B. Porter, supra note 28; A.R. Chapman, "A Violations
Approach for Monitoring the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights"
(1996) 18 Hum. Rts. Q. 23; P. Alston, "No Right to Complain About Being Poor: The Need for an
Optional Protocol to the Economic Rights Covenant" in A. Eide and J. Helgesen, eds, The Future of
Human Rights Protection in a Changing World (London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1991); Craven, supra
note 25; S. Leckie, "Another Step Towards Indivisibility: Identifying Key Features of Violations of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" (1998) 20 Hum. Rts. Q. 81.
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countries, so the prevailing model is one of "exporting" U.S. based "expertise" in
human rights to underdeveloped countries. There has been little consideration given
to the need to identify violations of fundamental human rights in countries like the
U.S. and Canada. It remains very difficult to get funding from northern based human
rights funders to apply international human rights law to northern countries them-
selves.31
This tendency to focus on human rights violations within developing rather than
affluent countries dominated the early years of social and economic rights jurispru-
dence at the international level. A primary focus of the debate about the status and
justiciability of social and economic rights was on the concept of "progressive
realization" in article 2(1) of the ICESCR, which sets out the government's responsi-
bilities in the following terms:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps ... to the maxi-
mum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate
means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures. 32
The concept of progressive realization and the standard of "the maximum of available
resources" is articulated explicitly in international human rights instruments only with
respect to economic, social and cultural rights. 33 For those opposed to recognizing
social and economic rights, this was an indicator that they were too vague and
undefined to be judicially enforced. 34
In response to this critique, scholars defending social and economic rights tended to
focus in the early years on the aspects of these rights that would conform with more
31. Leilani Farha, "Human Rights Across Cultures," Unpublished paper presented at "Beyond Beijing:
From Words to Action: Association for Women and Development 7h International Forum," Wash-
ington, D.C. (September, 1996). Copy on file with author.
32. ICESCR, supra note 18. article 2(1). For an overview of the requirements of Article 2(l) see M.
Craven, supra note 25.
33. Note that Article 4 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 20 November 1989, Can T.S. 1992
No. 3; UN Doc. A/RES/44125 (entered into force 2 September 1990 and in force for Canada 28 May
1990) [hereinafter CRC] provides that States Parties "shall undertake all appropriate legislative,
administrative and other measures for the implementation of the rights recognized in the present
Convention" and that "With regard to economic, social and cultural rights, States Parties shall
undertake such measures to the maximum extent of their available resources." Current scholarship
recognizes that the principle actually applies to all rights to various degrees. See, for example
Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights at paragraph 8 as
reproduced in "The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights"
(1998) 20 Hum. Rts. Q. 691.
34. For an overview of justiciability issues, see C. Scott, "The Interdependence and Permeability of
Human Rights Norms: Towards a Partial Fusion of the International Covenants on Human Rights"
(1989) 27 Osgoode Hall L.. 769. For an early debate of this issue see E. W. Vierdag, 'The Legal
Nature of the Rights Granted by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(1978) 9 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 69 and G. van Hoof, "The Legal Nature of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Rebuttal of Some Traditional Views" in P. Alston and K.
Tomasevski, eds., The Right to Food (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1984).
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traditional ideas of "universal application" - the obligations which were independent
of progressive realization, subject to immediate application and could thus be equally
applied to all countries, regardless of resources. There was thus a focus on the
"minimum core" obligations required for compliance with social and economic
rights. 35 This kind of "universality", however, is universal in name only. Naturally,
affluent countries tended to meet the minimum core obligations while poor countries
were more likely to violate them.
By the early 1990s, however, members of the CESCR, and other international human
rights experts, began to consider more carefully standards that would apply to coun-
tries with the resources necessary to move well beyond these "minimums." While
continuing to identify issues with respect to minimum core content of rights, the
CESCR's General Comment No. 3: The nature of state parties 'obligations,36 adopted
in 1990, places more weight on how compliance with progressive realization can be
reviewed. The Committee states that the notion of progressive realization places
serious obligations on governments to demonstrate that they have taken steps that are
"deliberate, concrete and targeted as clearly as possible towards meeting the obliga-
tions" and that they have an obligation "to move as expeditiously and effectively as
possible towards that goal." 37 Significantly for what would be occurring in many
affluent countries in subsequent years, the Committee further held that "deliberately
retrogressive measures" or backward movement in the protection of social and
economic rights "would need to be fully justified by reference to the totality of the
rights provided for in the Covenant and in the context of the full use of the maximum
of available resources."' 38
The following year, the CESCR revised its Reporting Guidelines to place greater
emphasis on the obligation to report meaningful evidence with respect to available
resources, (such as per capita gross national product, external debt and distribution of
income), progressive realization (showing changes in living conditions and pro-
gramme commitments over time) and the situation of the poorest households and
vulnerable groups. 39 The new focus on available economic resources, progressive
improvement and the position of "vulnerable and disadvantaged groups" set the stage
for a more rigorous assessment of whether affluent countries were meeting their
obligations under the Covenant. With the highest Gross Domestic Product per capita
35. The earlier preoccupation with minimums is evident in the "Limburg Principles on the Implementa-
tion of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights", printed in (1987) 9 Hum. Rts. Q.
36. United Nations Economic and Social Council, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Fifth Sess., 1990, General Comment No. 3: The nature of States parties' obligations (art 2(1)),
E/1991/23 [hereinafter General Comment No. 3].
37. Ibid. at paras. 2 and 9.
38. Ibid. at para. 9. For discussion of what he calls the "ratchet effect" of the doctrine of progressive
realization, see C. Scott, "Covenant Constitutionalism and the Canada Assistance Plan" (1995) 6
Constitutional Forum 79 at 82. See also C. Scott and P. Macklem, "Constitutional Ropes of Sand or
Justiciable Guarantees? Social Rights in a New South African Constitution" (1992) 141 U. Pa. L.
Rev. I at 80-81.
39. Reporting Guidelines, supra note 26 at 88,99.
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of the major industrialized countries that had ratified the ICESCR, Canada would be
scrutinized to determine if it was properly using its available resources to meet its
commitments to move toward the fulfillment of social and economic rights, and to
address the situation of the most disadvantaged groups.
II. THE EMERGING CONSENSUS AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL
ABOUT POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN CANADA
A. 1993 CESCR Review of Compliance with ICESCR
Canada's first harsh human rights review before a United Nations treaty monitoring
body occurred at the CESCR in 1993, at its Second Periodic Review under the
ICESCR. The Committee's Concluding Observations on Canada received consider-
able attention internationally as well as domestically because they indicated a new
resolve by the CESCR to hold affluent countries accountable to standards of progres-
sive realization. 40 The Committee focused particularly on Canada's apparent non-
compliance with article 11 of the Covenant "the right to an adequate standard of living,
including adequate food, clothing and housing" and addressed the obligations under
article 2 of the Covenant to apply the "maximum of available resources" to the
progressive realization of this right. It strongly condemned the level and severity of
poverty among vulnerable groups, particularly single mothers, the increasing reliance
on foodbanks, the gap between social assistance rates and the poverty line, and the
minimal allocation of resources to address homelessness. 4 1 A new focus on the
obligation to apply available resources to protect the interests of vulnerable groups
and to move forward in addressing problems of poverty was prominent:
In view of the obligation arising out of article 2 of the Covenant to apply the
maximum of available resources to the progressive realization of the rights recog-
nized in the treaty, and considering Canada's enviable situation with regard to such
resources, the Committee expresses concern about the persistence of poverty in
Canada. There seems to have been no measurable progress in alleviating poverty
over the last decade, nor in alleviating the severity of poverty among a number of
particularly vulnerable groups.42
B. 1998 CESCR Review of Compliance with ICESCR
If failure to make "measurable progress" in alleviating poverty among vulnerable
groups was the prominent theme in Canada's 1993 review, "retrogressive measures"
was the theme at its next review before the CESCR in November, 1998. 43 After five
40. United Nations Economic and Social Council, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Official Records, 1994, Supplement No.3 Consideration of Reports Submitted by States parties
Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (Canada), Geneva, 10 June 1993, E/C 12/1993/19 [hereinafter Conclud-
ing Observations, CESCR, 1993]
41. ibid. at paras. 101, 102, 104, 105, 109.
42. Ibid. at para. 101.
43. United Nations Economic and Social Council, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
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years of robust economic growth, the problems that had been identified in 1993 had
grown considerably worse, largely through the predictable results of deliberate legis-
lative and policy changes. The Committee noted that the Federal Government and the
provinces had implemented dramatic cuts to social programmes with severe conse-
quences for the most vulnerable groups, particularly women.44 Further, the Federal
Government had removed a principle feature of the protection of the right to an
adequate standard of living in Canada by revoking the Canada Assistance Plan45
(CAP).
The replacement of the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP) by the Canada Health and
Social Transfer (CHST) entails a range of adverse consequences for the enjoyment
of Covenant rights by disadvantaged groups in Canada. The Government informed
the Committee in its 1993 report that CAP set national standards for social welfare,
required that work by welfare recipients be freely chosen, guaranteed the right to an
adequate standard of living and facilitated court challenges of federally-funded
provincial social assistance programmes which did not meet the standards pre-
scribed in the Act. In contrast, CHST has eliminated each of these features and
significantly reduced the amount of cash transfer payments provided to the prov-
inces to cover social assistance. 46
The Committee observed that with the elimination of national standards in CAP,
provinces had proceeded to institute drastic cuts to social assistance levels which, in
1993, had been criticized for already being so far below the poverty line:
The Committee received information to the effect that cuts of about 10 per cent in
social assistance rates for single people have been introduced in Manitoba; 35 per
cent in those for single people in Nova Scotia; and 21.6 per cent in those for both
families and single people in Ontario. These cuts appear to have had a significantly
adverse impact on vulnerable groups, causing increases in already high levels of
homelessness and hunger.47
The CESCR issued an extensive list of other areas in which Canada appeared to have
violated the ICESCR. There had been no progress made or commitment shown to
address the most serious issues of disadvantage, such as alleviating social and
economic deprivation among Aboriginal people or in addressing the plight of refugees
denied access to social programmes. 48 The discriminatory "clawback" of the National
Child Benefit Supplement meant that the major initiative to address child poverty
provided no benefit for families on social assistance in most provinces. 49 There was
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant:
Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Canada), 10
December 1998, E/C. 12/l/Add.31 [hereinafter Concluding Observations, CESCR, 1998].
44. Ibid. at paras. 22, 28.
45. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-1.
46. Concluding Observations, CESCR, 1998, supra note 43 at para. 19.
47. Ibid. at para. 21.
48. Ibid. at paras. 17, 18, 37, 39.
49. Ibid. at paras. 22, 44.
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evidence of backward movement in many other areas such as restrictions on eligibility
for unemployment insurance, the implementation of workfare and other discriminatory
provisions against welfare recipients, programme cuts which discriminated against
women, and increased reliance on food banks.50 The Committee was "gravely con-
cerned that such a wealthy country as Canada has allowed the problem of homeless-
ness and inadequate housing to grow to such proportions that the mayors of Canada's
10 largest cities have now declared homelessness a national disaster," noting that
"provincial social assistance rates and other income assistance measures have clearly
not been adequate to cover rental costs of the poor."5 1
The 1998 Concluding Observations of the CESCR, like those it issued in 1993 were
the subject of extensive media coverage and heated parliamentary debate. On both
occasions, the Government of Canada took the "low road" in response to the criticism.
After years of promoting the U.N. treaty monitoring system abroad and urging
compliance with international human rights in other countries, Canada's reaction to
being on the receiving end of criticism by a treaty monitoring body was to attack the
credibility of the review.52 Politicians and government officials, still living largely
within the social and economic rights paradigm of the previous decade, found it
outrageous that Canada should be condemned for violating social and economic rights
by a Committee including experts from southern countries where levels of extreme
poverty made Canada's problems, in their view, insignificant. 53
Subsequent reviews by other U.N. human rights treaty monitoring bodies, however,
suggested that Canada's problem was not simply a strained relationship with the
CESCR and with evolving jurisprudence in the area of social and economic rights.
Policies which exacerbated poverty among disadvantaged groups in Canada were
increasingly seen at the international level not simply as violations of social and
economic rights, but also as substantive violations of equality rights and other civil
and political rights.
C. 1997 CEDAW Review
Canada's 1997 review under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women54 confirmed a primary concern of the CESCR in the
context of women's human rights. The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimina-
tion Against Women (CEDAW), which monitors compliance with the Convention,
expressed concern about "the deepening poverty among women, particularly among
single mothers, aggravated by the withdrawal, modification or weakening of social
50. Ibid. at paras. 20,21,26,27, 30, 31, 32, 33.
51. Ibid. at paras. 24, 25.
52. G. York, "UN Body Chastises Canada on Poverty" The Globe and Mail (29 May 1993) Al; R.
Speirs, "UN Report on Poverty Levels is Flawed, Tories Say" Toronto Star (1 June 1993).
53. For description and commentary on Canada's reaction, see supra note 6 at 104-105.
54. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 18 December 1979,
1249 U.N.T.S. 13, Can. T.S. 1982 No. 31 (entered into force 3 September 1981, accession by
Canada 10 January 1982).
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assistance programmes." 55 The Committee recommended that "the Government
address urgently the factors responsible for increasing poverty among women and
especially women single parents, and that it develop programmes and policies to
combat such poverty." 56 Responding to the social assistance cut-backs, it recom-
mended that "social assistance programmes directed at women be restored to an
adequate level." 57
The Committee addressed itself to the discrepancy between Canada's positive role at
the international level in promoting the human rights of women and domestic policies
which reinforced the erosion of women's social and economic rights both within
Canada and elsewhere:
The restructuring of the economy, a phenomenon occurring in Canada and other
highly industrialized countries, appeared to have had a disproportionate impact on
women. Although the Government had introduced many measures designed to improve
the status of women, the restructuring was seriously threatening to erode the signifi-
cant gains and advances made by Canadian women. Given the Government's proud
record of leadership on women's issues globally, those developments would not
only have an impact on Canadian women, but would also be felt by women in other
countries.5 8
D. 1999 HRC Review of Compliance with ICCPR
The concern of CEDAW about the discriminatory effect of social programme reduc-
tions on women was reiterated by the U.N. Human Rights Committee (HRC) in its
Fifth Periodic Review of Canada under the ICCPR in March, 1999. The HRC echoed
the concerns of CEDAW and CESCR about the extraordinary extent of poverty among
women with children in Canada. It found that social programme cuts and other
government action responsible for perpetuating such poverty in Canada constitute
discrimination against women as well as a failure to provide necessary protections to
which children are entitled under the ICCPR:
The Committee is concerned that many women have been disproportionately
affected by poverty. In particular, the very high poverty rate among single moth-
ers leaves their children without the protection to which they are entitled under
the Covenant. While the delegation expressed a strong commitment to address
these inequalities in Canadian society, the Committee is concerned that many of
the programme cuts in recent years have exacerbated these inequalities and
harmed women and other disadvantaged groups. The Committee recommends a
thorough assessment of the impact of recent changes in social programmes on
55. United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Adoption of the
Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women on its Sixteenth
Session: Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women (Canada), 29 February 1997, A152138/Rev.1 at paras. 306-343 [hereinafter Concluding
Observations, CEDAW, 1997].
56. Ibid. at para. 336.
57. Ibid. at para. 342.
58. Ibid. at para. 321.
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women and that action be undertaken to redress any discriminatory effects of these
changes.59
The HRC also joined the CESCR in condemning the discriminatory clawback from
families on social assistance of the National Child Benefit Supplement, noting that
this "may lead to non-compliance with article 24 of the Covenant." 60 Article 24
guarantees to every child, without discrimination "the right to such measures of
protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society
and the State." 6 1 Further, the HRC linked homelessness to the guarantee of the right
to life under article 6 of the Covenant:
The Committee is concerned that homelessness has led to serious health problems
and even to death. The Committee recommends that the State party take positive
measures required by article 6 to address this serious problem.62
While the link between homelessness and the right to life may seem obvious, this was
the first time the HRC found that a failure to take "positive measures" to address
homelessness may be found to violate the right to life under the ICCPR - at least in a
country which so obviously has the resources to ensure that everyone has access to
adequate housing.
In the past, the HRC has tended to leave poverty issues to the CESCR. Its 1999 review
of Canada broke new ground by focusing on the extent to which increasing poverty
among disadvantaged groups in so affluent a country as Canada engages not only
social and economic but also civil and political rights. The HRC focused on many
of the same issues as those addressed by its ICESCR counterpart and derived, from
civil and political rights, similar substantive obligations to address poverty among
disadvantaged groups. While not recognized explicitly in the Concluding Obser-
vations, the availability of resources on the part of Canada to remedy these
problems was clearly a consideration. Even without express recognition of the right
to an adequate standard of living, the ICCPR requires positive measures to address
homelessness in order to protect the right to life, positive measures to address child
poverty in order to protect the rights of children, and positive measures to maintain
adequate social programmes in order to ensure women's equality rights. Compliance
with these substantive obligations can only be assessed in relation to competing needs
and available resources.
In the context of the abundance of resources available to governments in Canada and
the absence of competing needs of the sort that are faced by more impoverished
countries, homelessness and poverty among disadvantaged groups in Canada is now
59. United Nations Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties
Under Article 40 of the Covenant. Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee (Can-
ada), Geneva, 07 April 1999, CCPR/C/79/Add. 105 (1999) at para. 20 [hereinafter Concluding
Observations, HRC, 1999].
60. Ibid. at para. 18.
61. JCCPR, supra note 20.
62. Concluding Observations, HRC, 1999, supra note 59 at para. 20.
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seen at the international level as clear evidence of non-compliance with the broad
spectrum of fundamental human rights recognized in international human rights law
ratified by Canada.
E. Bringing Human Rights Review of Poverty Home to Canada
Within an adjudicative model, and drawing both on social and economic and on civil
and political rights, we have seen emerging an increasing international focus on
Canada's non-compliance with substantive obligations to address poverty and social
disadvantage among vulnerable groups. Poor people in Canada have found, within the
U.N. treaty monitoring review process, a venue in which their fundamental human
rights issues can be adjudicated. But there are serious limitations to this venue. The
reviews occur, at best, once every five years, outside of Canada. The most recent
reviews, as noted by Craig Scott, raise a critical question. How do we incorporate this
type of adjudication of the rights of poor people in Canada into domestic human rights
adjudication?
These Concluding Observations represent an interlinked expression of concern
about a host of failures by Canada to adhere fully to its international human rights
obligations in the two treaties. Indeed, it is not an overstatement to describe the two
sets of Concluding Observations as pathbreaking in their focused treatment of the
overlapping and shared obligations which emanate from the two Covenants as a
partly fused legal order. In particular, the rich potential meaning the HRC has
already given to the right to life and the right to non discrimination in the above-
mentioned General Comments has moved from the realm of potential to the realm
of firm legal obligations vis-A-vis the less advantaged in an affluent state like
Canada. Significantly, both committees' Concluding Observations also address a
number of inadequacies in the opportunities for legal protection in Canada's legal
system of Covenant rights in such a way that we cannot, if we act at all in good
faith, relegate the committees' concerns to some rarefied international space.63
As noted above, Canadian political and human rights culture has tended to assign
poverty issues to the social policy realm and to exclude them from the domain of
human rights. Domestic response to the findings of human rights treaty monitoring
bodies with respect to poverty and homelessness in Canada have similarly tended to
focus on the social policy implications of these findings rather than on their implications
for human rights in Canada. The various Committees' Concluding Observations have
been mistaken by the media, the courts, the government and by others as a kind of
expert U.N. "Report" assessing how well Canada is measuring up to social policy
norms and standards. While the public attention to important policy issues that has
been generated by the Concluding Observations is not without benefit, that is not why
poor people and human rights advocates in Canada have turned to these procedures
and it does not capture what the experience at the international level has been all about,
either subjectively or objectively.
63. C. Scott, supra note 6 at 99.
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Those of us who have attended the reviews, particularly by the CESCR, have discussed
among ourselves a shared experience of the impact of seeing Canada through the glass
of an emerging international human rights framework. Low income participants in
particular, have described a sense of being "heard" for the first time. The realities of
poverty and homeless in Canada come into a sharper focus even for those who have
lived them, through a human rights scope that is not yet available at home. 64 It is hard
to imagine that Canada's human rights issues are very urgent when other NGOs are
working on the AIDS epidemic in Africa and the devastation of Hurricane Mitch in
Honduras and Nicaragua. Yet these same NGOs are astounded to hear of homelessness
and foodbanks in Canada. Similarly, Committee members who deal with problems of
extreme poverty in other countries do not find what is happening in Canada in any
way insignificant. On the contrary, they have become increasingly frustrated with the
smug complacency of the Canadian delegation precisely because the violations of
human rights in Canada could so easily be remedied. In Canada, particularly in the
late 1990s, poverty and homelessness were clearly the result of legislative choices by
governments.
As Sarah Sharpe, a low income advocate and President of the National Anti-Poverty
Organization wrote of her experience at the CESCR in Geneva in 1993:
One question, which I felt was very powerful and still stands out in my mind, was
from a gentleman from Tunisia who asked the Canadian delegation: how is it that
Canada, one of the richest nations in the world, having most of the world's fresh
water supply and more housing than it needs, still has so much poverty? How is that
possible? But there was no answer!65
Government "choices" in affluent countries which engage fundamental values of
dignity, security and equality by ignoring or exacerbating poverty among vulnerable
groups are seen sharply in this light to go beyond social policy and to enter very clearly
into the domain of human rights, requiring effective human rights adjudication and
review.
U.N. human rights treaty monitoring reviews and adjudication procedures are not
social policy reviews but consideration of compliance with fundamental human rights
assessed in the context of the resources available to fulfill them. They are supplemen-
tary to, and cannot replace domestic legal protections of these rights. As the CESCR
notes in its General Comment No. 9: The Domestic Application of the Covenant:
64. See, for example, Sarah Sharpe's article in the NAPO News, describing the 1993 CESCR review in
Geneva:
We concluded the writing and editing at around three Monday morning and I finally went
home to take advantage of what was left of sleep time. I didn't get much sleep though -
I kept seeing the faces of Canada's poor its children, its elderly, the homeless, the street
people, the foodbank users, the single parents, Native Peoples, those who died because
they were evicted from their homes, and those who took up the fight of challenging the
courts by letting their cases go public. (S. Sharpe, supra note 23 at 2.)
65. Ibid.
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In general, legally binding international human rights standards should operate
directly and immediately within the domestic legal system of each State party,
thereby enabling individuals to seek enforcement of their rights before national
courts and tribunals. The rule requiring the exhaustion of domestic remedies rein-
forces the primacy of national remedies in this respect. The existence and further
development of international procedures for the pursuit of individual claims is
important, but such procedures are ultimately only supplementary to effective
national remedies.66
A primary focus of treaty monitoring review and recommendations must therefore be
on the extent to which international human rights are protected domestically. In the
next part I describe the assessments made by the CESCR as to what types of human
rights protections we lack in Canada and what we need to do to transform our domestic
approach into one which is consistent with international human rights norms. In the
parlance of the CESCR, the issue of equipping the domestic human rights system to
address identified violations of international human rights is the obligation to provide
effective domestic remedies. For poor people in Canada, it is a matter of "bringing
home" systemic human rights claims that in the 1990s only received fair hearings in
Geneva and New York.
Ill. THE REQUIREMENT OF EFFECTIVE LEGAL REMEDIES
For both the CESCR and the HRC, the growing crisis in human rights in Canada is
not defined by the substantive violations alone. The increasing problems of poverty
amidst affluence suggest a fundamental flaw not only in the prevailing political and
economic paradigm, but also in the ruling human rights paradigm. Canada's domestic
approach to the protection of human rights has been seen by the treaty monitoring
bodies as increasingly incapable of addressing the most critical human rights issues
in the social and economic domain.
The CESCR has paid particular attention to the discrepancy between the rights which
Canada recognizes and promotes internationally, and the approach that has been taken
to the interpretation of the Charter. At both its 1993 and 1998 reviews, the Committee
received extensive information on Charter jurisprudence from the Government and
NGO submissions. 67 The Committee focused on two rights of particular relevance for
the protection of social and economic rights: "security of the person" and "equality".
A. 1993 CESCR Review of Remedies under the Charter
In 1993 the CESCR gave positive recognition to two cases dealing with equality rights
under section 15 of the Charter - the Supreme Court's decision in Schachter v.
Canada68 to extend parental benefits and the decision of the Nova Scotia Court of
66. United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Nineteenth Session General
Comment No. 9: The Domestic Application of the Covenant, Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, Geneva, 16 November - 4 December 1998, E/C.12/1998/24 [hereinafter General
Comment No. 9] at para. 4.
67. See Right to An Adequate Standard of Living in a Land of Plenty, supra note 23.
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Appeal in Dartmouth/Halifax County Regional Housing Authority v. Sparks69 to
extend security of tenure to residents of public housing. These types of positive rights
remedies were seen to have provided effective remedies to Covenant violations, since
the ICESCR requires the protection of security of tenure and the provision of adequate
maternity and parental benefits and further requires that these rights be enjoyed
without discrimination. 70
The Committee was also encouraged by early Charter jurisprudence from the Supreme
Court of Canada suggesting a fusing of Charter interpretation with international
human rights norms, including social and economic rights. It took particular note of
the decision in Slaight Communications v. Davidson7 l in which Chief Justice Dickson,
writing for the majority of the Supreme Court, had invoked the right to work under
the ICESCR as an aid to interpreting the Charter, affirming in this context that "the
Charter should generally be presumed to provide protection at least as great as that
afforded by similar provisions in international human rights documents which Canada
ratified." 72
With respect to section 7 of the Charter and the right to security of the person, the
Committee considered the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Irwin Toy v.
Attorney General of Quebec.73 In that decision, the Court stated that it would be
"precipitous" to exclude, "at this early moment in the history of Charter interpreta-
tion," such economic rights, "included in various international covenants, as rights to
social security, equal pay for equal work, adequate food, clothing and shelter."74 In
light of these developments in Charter interpretation, the Committee included the
following in its Concluding Observations, under "Positive aspects":
The Committee was informed that the Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees,
in section 7, the right to security of person and, in section 15, the equal benefit and
protection of the law. It notes with satisfaction that Canadian courts have applied
these provisions to cover certain economic and social rights, and that the Supreme
Court of Canada has, on occasion, turned to the International Covenant on Eco-
68. Schachter v. Canada, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679 [hereinafter Schachter].
69. Dartmouth/Halifax County Regional Housing Authority v. Sparks (1993), 101 D.L.R. (4th) 224
(N.S.C.A.) [hereinafter Sparks].
70. These protections are expressed in, respectively, United Nations Economic and Social Council,
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Sixth Sess., General Comment No. 4: The
Right to Adequate Housing (Article 11(1) of the Covenant), Geneva, December 13, 1991, E/1992/23,
paragraph 8(a), [hereinafter General Comment No 4]; and, ICESCR, supra note 18, article 10. The
equal enjoyment of social and economic rights without discrimination is guaranteed in article 2(2) of
the ICESCR.
71. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038 [hereinafter Slaight Communications].
72. Ibid. at 1056.
73. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 [hereinafter Irwin Toy].
74. Ibid. at 1003-04
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nomic, Social and Cultural Rights for guidance as to the meaning of provisions of
the Charter.75
On the other hand, NGO submissions documented the pleadings of provincial govern-
ments and judicial reasoning in a number of lower court Charter cases in which low
income claimants were deprived of legal remedies to evident social and economic
rights violations. In Fernandes v Director of Social Services (Winnipeg Central),7 6
for example, a permanently disabled man suffering from muscular atrophy with
progressive respiratory failure had appealed a denial of special assistance from social
services to cover the cost of necessary attendant care. Without it, he would be forced
to abandon his home to live permanently in a hospital. He argued that the right to
security of the person and the right to equality ought to be interpreted consistently
with Canada's international human rights obligations to ensure an adequate standard
of living. In the appeal, the Attorney General for Manitoba took the position that the
Charter does not protect economic rights under section 7 "with the possible exception
of extreme cases where needs fundamental to human life or survival are involved" 77
and that the right to equality applies only to discriminatory government action, not to
disadvantage that exists independently of government action. The Court of Appeal in
Manitoba agreed that the interests raised in the appeal were outside the scope of
sections 7 and 15 of the Charter and dismissed the claim. 7 8
Similarly, in Conrad v. County of Halifax,79 in which a single mother had been denied
interim assistance to cover basic necessities pending an appeal of a termination of
assistance, the Attorney General for Nova Scotia had argued that the right to security of
the person confers no right to be "free from poverty and the physical, emotional and social
consequences of that condition." 8 0 Both the trial court and the Court of Appeal agreed
that the Charter cannot provide protection of economic interests of this sort. 8 1
The Committee reviewed at that time the trial court decision in the case of Louise
Gosselin (who, at the time of writing, seven years later, awaits a decision on a leave
application at the Supreme Court of Canada). Ms. Gosselin's social assistance benefit
had been reduced to only $170 per month, 20% of the poverty line for that year, on
the basis that she was a single employable person between the ages of 18 and 30. Her
claim was based not only on sections 7 and 15 of the Canadian Charter, but also relied
on section 45 of the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms82 (the Qu6bec
Charter). Though not subject to the complaints procedure under the Qu6bec Charter,
75. Concluding Observations, CESCR, 1993, supra note 40 at para. 93.
76. (1992), 93 D.L.R. (4th) 402 (Man. C.A.) [hereinafter Fernandes].
77. Fernandes v. Director of Social Services (Winnipeg Central) (Man. C.A. File No. Al 91-30-00477)
Factum of the Respondent and the Attorney General of Manitoba, at 16, 19.
78. Ibid.
79. Conrad v. County of Halifax (1993) 124 N.S.R. (2d) 251,aff'd (1994), 130 N.S.R. (2d) 305 (N.S.C.A.)
[hereinafter Conrad].
80. Factum of the County of Halifax, cited in the Right to An Adequate Standard of Living in a Land of
Plenty, supra note 23 at 76.
81. Conrad, supra note 79.
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section 45, part of the section on "social and economic rights", guarantees to every
person in need "the right for himself [herself] and his [her] family, to measures of
financial assistance and to social measures provided for by law, susceptible of ensuring
such person an acceptable standard of living (niveau de vie drcent)." 83 The court
found that there is no justiciable right to adequate financial assistance either under the
Qudbec Charter or the Canadian Charter. In coming to this conclusion, the court
considered the right to an adequate standard of living in article 11 of the ICESCR. The
court reasoned that because this right is subject to "progressive realization" it "signi-
fies a mere intent" or policy objective of government rather than an enforceable human
right.84
In response to these and other cases documented in the NGO 1993 submissions, the
CESCR expressed concern that "some provincial governments in Canada appear to
take the position in courts that the rights in article 11 of the Covenant are not protected,
or only minimally protected, by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms."85 It expressed
further concern that "in a few cases, courts have ruled that the right to security of the
person in the Charter does not protect Canadians from social and economic depriva-
tion, or from infringements of their rights to adequate food, clothing and housing." 86
The Committee had questioned the government delegation about how far the protec-
tion of security of the person may go in protecting the rights under article 11 to an
adequate standard of living, including adequate food, clothing and housing. The
delegation responded by saying that:
While the guarantee of security of the person under Section 7 of the Charter might
not lead to a right to a certain type of social assistance, it ensured that persons were
not deprived of the basic necessities of life.87
One of the key recommendations in 1993 from the Committee was to "encourage the
Canadian Courts to continue to adopt a broad and purposive approach to the interpre-
tation of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and of human rights legislation so as to
provide appropriate remedies against violations of social and economic rights in
Canada."88 In response to the reasoning of the trial court in Gosselin and other cases,
as well as to information provided to the Committee about the unenforceable "social
charter" or "social and economic union" provisions contained in the Charlottetown
Accord, 89 the Committee expressed concern that "in some court decisions, and in
82. Charte des droits et liberti de la personne, R.S.Q. c. C- 12.
83. Ibid., s.45.
84. Gosselin v. Qudbec, [1992] R.J.Q. 1647 (C.S.) at 1669, aff'd (6 April 1999) Montreal 500-09-
001092-923 (C.A.). Leave sought to the S.C.C. [hereinafter Gosselin].
85. Concluding Observations, CESCR, 1993, supra note 40 at para. 110.
86. Ibid. at para. 112.
87. UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Summary Records, Eighth Session. UN
Doc. E/C.12/1993/SR.5 at para. 21.
88. Ibid. at para. 118.
89. Consensus Report on the Constitution, Charlottetown, August 28, 1992, Final Text. (Ottawa: 1992)
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recent constitutional discussions, social and economic rights have been described as
mere 'policy objectives' of Governments rather than as fundamental human rights." 90
B. 1998 CESCR Review of Domestic Legal Remedies
In its 1998 review of Canada, the inadequacies of domestic human rights protections
continued to be a major focus of attention, centering again on sections 7 and 15 of the
Charter. In a follow-up to its 1993 concerns and recommendations regarding the
application of section 7 of the Charter, the Committee asked the Government the
following question:
In 1993 the Government had informed the Committee that section 7 of the Charter
at least guaranteed that people are not to be deprived of basic necessities and may
be interpreted to include rights under the Covenant, such as rights under article 11
[to an adequate standard of living, including adequate food, clothing and housing]."
Is that still the position of all governments in Canada?91
The federal Government responded to the Committee's question as follows:
The Supreme Court of Canada has stated that section 7 of the Charter may be
interpreted to include the rights protected under the Covenant (see decision of
Slaight Communications v. Davidson [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038). The Supreme Court
has also held section 7 as guaranteeing that people are not to be deprived of basic
necessities (see decision of Irwin Toy v. A.-G. Quebec, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927). The
Government of Canada is bound by these interpretations of section 7 of the Charter.92
Thus, the Committee noted among positive developments that:
[T]he Federal Government has acknowledged, in line with the interpretation adopted by
the Supreme Court, that section 7 of the Charter (liberty and security of the person)
guarantees the basic necessities of life, in accordance with the Covenant. 93
In reviewing Supreme Court section 15 jurisprudence, the Committee was particularly
pleased by the Eldridge94 decision. In that case the Court considered a failure of the
British Columbia Government to provide interpreter services for the Deaf and Hard
of Hearing in the provision of healthcare. In finding that the province had a positive
obligation to ensure that such services are provided, a unanimous Court explicitly
90. Concluding Observations, CESCR 1993, supra note 40 at para. 110.
91. List of Issues, supra note 27 at para. 53.
92. Responses to Supplementary Questions, supra note 27 at Question 53 (Government of Canada). The
Canadian Delegation's description of the Irwin Toy decision actually goes further than the decision
itself. The Court in Irwin Toy acknowledged that including the rights such as those in article 11 of
the Covenant under section 7 was a possible interpretation and explicitly did not "rule out" such an
interpretation. However, the pleadings of the Canadian Government in 1998 were consistent with
their undertaking in 1993 to the effect that section 7 at least protects against being deprived of basic
necessities.
93. Concluding Observations, CESCR, 1998, supra note 43 at para. 5.
94. [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 [hereinafter Eldridge].
(2000) 15 Journal of Law and Social Policy
rejected the basis on which so many lower court decisions reviewed by the Committee
had dismissed poverty related claims:
The Committee notes with satisfaction that the Supreme Court of Canada has not
followed the decisions of a number of lower courts and has held that section 15
(equality rights) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter)
imposes positive obligations on governments to allocate resources and to implement
programmes to address social and economic disadvantage, thus providing effective
domestic remedies under section 15 of the Charter for disadvantaged groups.95
As in 1993, NGO submissions documented government pleadings in court which were
quite inconsistent with the position taken by Canada before the Committee and with
what the Committee saw as positive developments at the Supreme Court of Canada. 96
Of particular concern to the CESCR were the pleadings of the Government of Ontario
in Masse v. Ontario (Ministry of Community and Social Services),97 in which twelve
Ontario social assistance recipients, including seven sole support mothers, asked the
Ontario Court (General Division) to strike down a twenty-one percent cut in provincial
social assistance rates. The CESCR was provided with some of the uncontroverted
evidence in the case that showed, among other things, the cuts would lead to significant
increases in homelessness and would dislocate approximately 120,000 families.9 8
The Court in Masse summarized the Attorney General's pleadings in the following
terms:
In connection with the Charter arguments, the respondents [counsel for the Attor-
ney General of Ontario] argue that the plight of welfare recipients, although urgent
and serious, relates to their inability to provide for themselves. That inability does
not arise from government activity and hence under s.32 of the Charter, the Charter
is not applicable. They argue the effect of the provincial welfare legislation and its
regulations is to alleviate the problems and financial burdens of those in need by
providing financial "last resort" benefits.
They argue that while poverty is a deeply troubling social problem, it is not uncon-
stitutional. They also take the position that there is no right to social assistance nor
to a minimum standard of living under s.7.99
The court in Masse accepted evidence that "the effects of poverty include low birth
weight, poor nutrition, inadequaie housing, ill health and stress, all of which affect the
95. Concluding Observations, CESCR, 1998, supra note 43 at para. 4.
96. See, in particular, Charter Committee on Poverty Issues, Submissions to The Committee On Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights by the Charter Committee on Poverty Issues November 16, 1998.
Online: <www.web.net/ccpi>.
97. Masse v. Ontario (Ministry of Community and Social Services) (1996), 134 D.L.R. (4th) 20, leave to
appeal to Ontario Court of Appeal denied (1996), 40 Admin. L.R. 87N, leave to appeal to the
Supreme Court of Canada denied (1996), 39 C.R.C. (2d) 375 [hereinafter Masse].
98. Affidavit of Michael Omstein, Application Record, Volume II, Tab 15; Affidavit of Gerard Ken-
nedy, Application Record, Volume II, Tab 14 in Masse v. Ontario, Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.) Court File
No. 590/95.
99. Masse, supra note 97 at 49 (per O'Brien J.).
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cognitive and psycho-social development of children" 100 and that the welfare cuts
would have severe consequences for social assistance recipients in Ontario:
The daily strain of surviving and caring for children on low and inadequate income
is unrelenting and debilitating. All recipients of social assistance and their depen-
dants will suffer in some way from the reduction in assistance. Many will be forced
to find other accommodation or make other living arrangements. If cheaper accom-
modation is not available, as may well be the case, particularly in Metropolitan
Toronto, many may become homeless. 101
The court nevertheless accepted the pleadings of the Attorney General of Ontario with
respect to the scope of rights under the Charter. O'Brien J. noted that "much economic
and social policy is simply beyond the institutional competence of the courts."' 102 He
found that:
S. 7 [of the Charter] does not provide the applicants with any legal rights to
minimal social assistance. The legislature could repeal the social assistance statutes.
... In my view, s.7 does not confer any affirmative right to governmental aid....
[M]oreover, there is no reason in law why the Government of Ontario must so
provide. 10 3
Similarly O'Driscoll J., in a separate concurring judgment, rejected the applicants'
claims on the basis that the court has no jurisdiction "to second guess policy/political
decisions."104
The Committee received information at the 1998 review about other cases in which
courts had refused to consider claims related to poverty issues on the basis that these
are not rights issues for adjudication by courts but rather policy decisions for the
consideration of legislatures. Debbie Clark, a single mother of a disabled child, for
example, was required to pay a $312 utility deposit because she had no previous
service in her name. Municipal welfare authorities would not cover this, so Ms. Clark
was threatened with having her hydro service disconnected. In dismissing her
challenge under sections 7 and 15 of the Charter to the deposit requirement, the
Ontario Court (General Division) held that "[t]his type of claim requires the kind of
value and policy judgments and degree of social obligation which should properly be
addressed by legislatures and responsible organs of government in a democratic
society, not by courts." 105
In another case reviewed by the Committee, New Brunswick (Minister of Health and
Community Services v. G. (j.),106 a single mother on social assistance challenged the
100. Ibid at 71 (per Corbett J.).
101. Ibid. at 69 (per Corbett J.).
102. Ibid at 46.
103. Ibid at 42-43.
104. Ibid. at 46-47.
105. Clark v. Peterborough Utilities Commission (1995), 24 O.R. (2d) 7 at 28 [hereinafter Clark].
106. Concluding Observations, CESCR, 1998, supra note 43 at paras. 16, 42, 51, 54.
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denial of legal aid in a custody proceeding on the basis of section 7 of the Charter.
The majority of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal (since reversed by the Supreme
Court of Canadal0 7) had dismissed the claim on the basis that "the provision of
domestic legal aid is a legislative function and not one for determination by the
courts." 108 The CESCR expressed concern about the limited access to civil legal aid
for some women and recommended that the provinces allocate more resources to this
area. Of even greater concern, however, was the judicial reasoning in this and other
cases reviewed which relegated exclusive responsibility for protecting the rights of
poor people to the legislature.
Judicial reasoning of this sort is clearly incompatible with the acceptance of social
and economic rights as fundamental human rights requiring effective domestic reme-
dies. The CESCR was deeply perturbed by the immense distance between the approach
of the courts in Masse, Clark, G.(J.) and other cases, and any interpretation and
application of the Charter which would be consistent with the ICESCR. The courts
had failed to make any attempt to provide effective remedies for violations of
Covenant rights by way of a "broad and purposive" interpretation of the Charter, as
the Committee had recommended in 1993. Rather, compelling equality and security
claims of poor people had been rejected on the basis of government pleadings and bold
judicial assertions that social and economic rights are not rights at all, but policy
choices that are not appropriate issues for the consideration of courts. The lower courts
were displaying a consistent pattern, invariably encouraged by government pleadings,
of narrowing the scope of Charter protections in order to exclude poverty issues and
any positive obligations on governments to comply with substantive obligations under
international human rights law.
The CESCR leads off its lengthy list of concerns with two caustic comments about
government pleadings and court decisions in Charter cases:
The Committee has received information about a number of cases in Which claims
were brought by people living in poverty (usually women with children) against
government policies which denied the claimants and their children adequate food,
clothing and housing. Provincial governments have urged upon their courts in these
cases an interpretation of the Charter which would deny any protection of Covenant
rights and consequently leave the complainants without the basic necessities of life
and without any legal remedy.
The Committee is deeply concerned at the information that provincial courts in
Canada have routinely opted for an interpretation of the Charter which excludes
protection of the right to an adequate standard of living and other Covenant rights.
The Committee notes with concern that the courts have taken this position despite
the fact that the Supreme Court of Canada has stated, as has the Government of
107. New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services v. G. (J.) (1999), 177 D.L.R. (4th) 124
(S.C.C.).
108. New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services v. G. (J.) (1997), 145 D.L.R. (4th) 349
(N.B.C.A.) at 356.
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Canada before this Committee, that the Charter can be interpreted so as to protect
these rights.109
The consensus and recommendations of the various treaty monitoring bodies send a
strong message of the need for reform of our approach to human rights in Canada. The
CESCR suggests, however, that the necessary reform does not mean reversing
Supreme Court jurisprudence on sections 7 and 15 of the Charter but rather, simply
applying it more consistently to the claims of poor people to security, dignity and
equality. The CESCR is clear that the courts in Canada have an important role to play
in protecting social and economic rights by way of Charter claims. In the final section,
I will review the Supreme Court's approach to the appropriate role of courts and
legislatures in relation to social and economic rights claims, and consider whether the
adjudication of social and economic rights claims can be accommodated within the
scope of what the Court has described as its proper role.
IV. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL VALUES:
REFINING THE INTERPRETIVE SCOPE OF THE CHARTER
A. The Interpretive Presumption
The directions from the CESCR to interpret the Charter so as to provide effective
remedies to violations of social and economic rights are grounded in the commonly
accepted relationship between international law and domestic law. As the CESCR
notes in its General Comment No. 9:
It is generally accepted that domestic law should be interpreted as far as possible in
a way which conforms to a State's international legal obligations. Thus, when a
domestic decision maker is faced with a choice between an interpretation of domes-
tic law that would place the state in breach of the Covenant and one that would
enable the State to comply with the Covenant, international law requires the choice
of the latter. Guarantees of equality and non-discrimination should be interpreted, to
the greatest extent possible, in ways which facilitate the full protection of economic,
social and cultural rights.110
The Supreme Court of Canada has affirmed the requirement that domestic law be
interpreted consistently with international human rights law on a number of occa-
sions.111 Most recently in Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigra-
tion),112 L'Heureux-Dub6, J. asserted for the majority, that international law is "a
critical influence on the interpretation of the scope of the rights included in the
Charter."113 She further elaborates on that principle in R. v. Ewanchuk, 1 14 where she
109. Concluding Observations, CESCR, 1998, supra note 43 at paras. 14, 15.
110. Supranote66atparas. 14, 15.
111. See, for example, Slaight Communications, supra note 71 and R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697.
112. Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] S.CJ. No. 39, online: QL (SCJ)
[hereinafter Baker].
113. Ibid. at para. 70.
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states that "our Charter is the primary vehicle through which international human
rights achieve a domestic effect." 115 She notes that "the equality guarantee, along with
the guarantee of security of the person, will be particularly important vehicles for
incorporating international human rights norms, as these two rights "embody the
notion of respect of human dignity and integrity."116
There would be no justification for excluding social and economic rights obligations
under international law from the general principle of consistent interpretation, partic-
ularly of the rights to equality and security of the person in the Charter. As noted
above, it was in the context of invoking the right to work under the ICESCR that the
Supreme Court adopted Dickson C.J.'s precept that "the Charter should generally be
presumed to provide protection at least as great as that afforded by similar provisions
in international human rights documents which Canada ratified."117 Social and eco-
nomic rights, particularly those linked with the right to an adequate standard of living,
including adequate food, clothing and housing, directly engage the fundamental values
of "respect of human dignity and integrity."
In this sense, the following proposal from the international human rights scholar
William Schabas seems entirely consistent with the Court's vision of the relationship
between the Charter and international human rights law:
Fifty years after its adoption, the economic, social and cultural rights set out in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights are subject to ongoing violation within
Canada, as the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has pointed out.
Judges can and should rectify the situation by adopting a judicial approach to
indivisibility, in effect reading into the Charter and the other relevant instruments
human rights which have been marginalized in the past. 118
Craig Scott similarly argues that the emerging consensus among international human
rights treaty monitoring bodies calls for a "judicial transformation" in which interna-
tional human rights values would permeate domestic human rights culture. He borrows
from a speech by Justice La Forest in which it is observed that "we are absorbing
international legal norms affecting the individual through our constitutional pores"
such that Canadian courts and many other national courts "are truly becoming
international courts in many areas involving the rule of law." 119 Scott notes, however,
that Justice La Forest's description "still applies much more to the Supreme Court than
114. R. v. Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330 [hereinafter Ewanchuk] at para. 73.
115. Ibid. at 365.
116. Ibid.
117. Slaight Communications, supra note 71 at 1056.
118. W.A. Schabas, "Freedom from Want: How Can We Make Indivisibility More than a Mere Slogan?"
(Building a Human Rights Agenda for the 21st Century: A Practical Celebration of the 50 th Anniver-
sary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Ottawa, Ontario, October 1-3, 1998) at 18-19,
quoted in M. Jackman, "What's Wrong with Social and Economic Rights?" (2000) 11:2 N.J.C.L.
(forthcoming).
119. G. La Forest, J., "The Expanding Role of the Supreme Court of Canada in International Law Issues"
(1996) 34 Can. Y. B. Int'l L.89 at 98, 100-101, quoted in C. Scott, supra note 6 at 110-111.
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it does to most lower courts" and as such is more of a "desirable orientation for the
future" than any existing "judicial ethos." 120
B. Judicial Reluctance to Intervene in the Social and Economic Domain
Ironically, in rejecting poverty related claims under the Charter, lower courts have
frequently relied on Justice La Forest, the same judge who speaks eloquently for the
absorption of international human rights law, who signed onto Dickson, C.J.'s majority
decision in Slaight Communications, and who affirmed on behalf of a unanimous
Court in Eldridge that the Charter imposes positive obligations on governments to
address the needs of disadvantaged groups. Virtually every lower court decision
reviewed and criticized by the CESCR relied around Justice La Forest's caution in
Andrews that: "Much economic and social policy-making is simply beyond the
institutional competence of the courts: their role is to protect against incursions on
fundamental values, not to second guess policy decisions." 121 Even in Eldridge itself,
at the same time as affirming positive obligations under the Charter consistent with
the recognition of social and economic rights, Justice La Forest noted that courts must
afford legislatures "wide latitude" when it comes to the distribution of resources:
It is also clear that while financial considerations alone may not justify Charter
infringements (Schachter [v. Canada] ...), governments must be afforded wide
latitude to determine the proper distribution of resources in society; see McKinney
[v. University of Guelph] ... and Egan [v. Canada] ... This is especially true where
Parliament, in providing social benefits, has to choose between disadvantaged
groups; see Egan. 122
Clearly the result in Eldridge demonstrates that these and other comments from the
Supreme Court suggesting deference to legislatures in the social and economic domain
ought not to be taken as justifying a refusal on the part of the courts to ensure that
governments meet their substantive obligations toward vulnerable and disadvantaged
groups. The Supreme Court has not, however, been as clear as it might have been about
how lower courts are to decide when to defer to legislatures and when to intervene.
Lower courts have rallied around three themes in Supreme Court jurisprudence in
dismissing poverty related claims: (a) reluctance to review decisions dealing with
positive obligations to allocate resources; (b) judicial incompetence in dealing with
social policy; and (c) reluctance to assume the "policy-making" role legitimately
assigned to elected legislatures. 123 While all of these principles involve valid judicial
and political concerns, they have been too often invoked by lower courts to justify an
abdication of judicial responsibility to uphold the constitutional rights of the most
vulnerable groups in the social and economic sphere. These concerns need to be
properly situated within the context of the broader purposes of the Charter, an
120. C. Scott, supra note 6, f.n. 48.
121. Andrews v. Law Society of British Colwnbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 123 at 194 [hereinafter Andrews].
122. Supra note 94 at para. 85.
123. For analysis of the themes of positive rights, competency and legitimacy, see C. Scott and P.
Macklem, supra note 38 and M. Jackman, supra note 118.
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appreciation of the contents of international human rights law, and a recognition of
the importance of protecting the rights of the most vulnerable groups.
C. Charter Rights and Positive Obligations
Positive obligations to "respect, protect and fulfill" human rights are at the heart of
the international human rights movement. 124 Treaty monitoring review, as noted
above, has increasingly focused on the requirement in the ICESCR of the application
of the "maximum of available resources", and held affluent countries accountable to
"progressive" standards. Similarly, the HRC has identified critical substantive obliga-
tions to address homelessness and poverty as issues linked with the right to life, the
right to equality and the special status of the needs of children in international human
rights law. If the Charter is to become a vehicle for giving domestic effect to Canada's
international human rights obligations, as envisaged by L'Heureux-Dub6, J. and the
rest of the Court in Baker, 125 substantive obligations must similarly frame the analysis
of these rights in the Charter.
Recognizing the positive components of rights in the Charter corresponds in a direct
fashion to recognizing the dignity and equality interests of the most disadvantaged
constituencies. Poor peoples' claims to dignity, security and equality occur largely in
the social and economic domain and frequently relate to governments' positive
obligations to address disadvantage. As Martha Jackman has noted, if these types of
claims are rejected, poor people are disenfranchised from an important aspect of a
participatory democracy.
It is important to realize that traditional distinctions between classical or negative
rights, and social and economic or positive rights, and the willingness to provide for
judicial enforcement of one, but not the other, operate in fact to discriminate against
the poor. To be in a position to complain about state interference with rights, one
has to exercise and enjoy them. But without access to adequate food, clothing,
income, education, housing and medical care, it is impossible to benefit from most
traditional human rights guarantees. 126
To the Supreme Court's credit, it has been fairly consistent in resisting the idea that
the Charter primarily protects "negative" rights. The Court has generally asserted that
Charter rights are a combination of positive and negative aspects, and that the courts
have an important role in ensuring compliance with both aspects. 127 This approach
has been affirmed not only in the interpretation of rights such as minority language
rights, set out in more positive terms in s. 23 of the Charter1 28 but also in the
124. For an outline of the three dimensions of "duties" see C. Scott and P. Macklem, ibid.
125. While in Baker lacobucci J. wrote a minority judgment which disagreed with the majority on the
interpretive use of international human rights law in administrative law, both the majority and
minority affirmed the importance of international law as an interpretive framework for the Charter,
Baker, supra note 112.
126. M. Jackman, supra note 118.
127. Schachter, supra note 68; Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 (hereinafter Vriend] at para. 64.
128. MahU v. Alberta, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 342 at 393; Reference re Public Schools Act (Man.), s. 79(3), (4)
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interpretation of more classical civil and political rights such as "freedom of expres-
sion". 129 The effectiveness of the Charter in protecting the dignity and security
interests of poor people, people with disabilities, and other disadvantaged groups,
however, relies to a large extent on the courts' treatment of positive rights claims under
sections 7 and 15.
(i) Positive Obligations under Section 15
The Supreme Court affirmed in Schachter that an equality right is "a hybrid of sorts,
since it is neither purely positive nor purely negative." The Court endorsed, within the
context of a respect for legislative purpose and Charter values, a "positive rights"
approach to remedies in cases of programmes which are under-inclusive, choosing to
"read into" legislation those groups that would otherwise be denied a benefit because
of a discriminatory provision. 130 The CESCR commented favourably on that decision,
and also on the Sparks decision, extending security of tenure to residents of public
housing. 13 1 A positive remedy of the sort endorsed by the Supreme Court in Schachter
and implemented by the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in Sparks is clearly more
consistent with the provisions of the ICESCR than the "equality with a vengeance"
approach that had previously been adopted by some lower courts, such as when
disparities between eligibility of single mothers and single fathers led the Nova Scotia
Court of Appeal to strike down the benefits of single mothers. 13 2
Substantive obligations under international law, however, go beyond the type of
positive remedy for discriminatory under-inclusion endorsed in Schachter and utilized
in Sparks. International human rights law does not only require that maternity and
parental benefits or security of tenure be provided to disadvantaged or excluded groups
in order to remedy discriminatory under-inclusion. It requires, more fundamentally,
that adequate programmes and benefits be provided and that appropriate legislation
be adopted to provide necessary protection and support for mothers, parents and
children, for example, or security of tenure for tenants. 133 Providing effective reme-
dies to violations of social and economic rights thus means not only providing legal
recourse when particular groups are discriminated against in the provision of benefits,
but also providing for legal remedies when governments simply fail to comply with
their positive obligations to provide adequately, through legislation or social pro-
grammes, for the needs of vulnerable groups. From the standpoint of international
human rights obligations, the responsibility of the courts to intervene to protect the
and (7), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 839 at 862-63, 866.
129. Haig v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 995.
130. Schachter, supra note 68 at 702, 721. For the Supreme Court's subsequently consideration of this
issue, see B. Porter, "Beyond Andrews: Substantive Equality and Positive Obligations After Eldridge
and Vriend " (1998) 9 Constitutional Forum 71.
131. Schachter, supra note 68 and Sparks, supra note 69.
132. Phillips v. Nova Scotia (1986), 27 D.L.R. (4th) 156 (N.S.S.C.). See also the related reference
decision in Ref. Re Family Benefits Act (1986), 75 N.S.R. (2d) 338 (N.S.C.A.).
133. These requirements can be found in: CEDAW, supra note 55, Article 11(2)(c), ICESCR, supra, note
18 Article 10, General Comment No. 4, supra note 70.
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fundamental human rights of disadvantaged groups should not only be triggered by
discriminatory provisions in social programmes or legislation. It should also be
triggered where governments are simply not meeting their normative obligations to
address the needs of vulnerable groups, particularly where they have adequate
resources to do so.
Lower courts' rejection of social and economic rights claims under section 15 of the
Charter have relied on assertions that governments are not required by section 15 to
implement programmes or to provide any particular "level" of benefit. 134 They have
consistently asserted that section 15 does not impose positive obligations on govern-
ments to remedy disadvantage existing independently of government action or legis-
lation. Thus, in Fernandes, Gosselin, Masse, and other cases reviewed by the CESCR,
poverty was found to be the result of personal circumstances rather than government
action and the courts held that there was consequently no obligation on governments
to implement programmes to address it.135 The CESCR was particularly shocked to
read so starkly in the Masse decision that "the legislature could repeal the social
assistance statutes," presumably to let single mothers, their children, people with
disabilities and others currently relying on social assistance simply go without food,
clothing or housing.136 Courts infer that if there is no obligation to implement
programmes or pass legislation in the first place then there can be no basis for
reviewing the adequacy of programmes or benefits, even where the benefits are clearly
necessary for the enjoyment of meaningful equality and dignity for those who rely on
them.
It is incomprehensible from the standpoint of international human rights law that the
guarantee of equality and dignity under the Charter does not include even the most
universally acknowledged responsibilities of governments to legislate and provide
necessary protections for vulnerable groups. International human rights law is founded
upon governmental obligations to implement the rights under various Covenants
through appropriate legislative and other measures. A Charter jurisprudence premised
on the absolute right of governments to revoke legislative protection or social pro-
grammes relied on by vulnerable groups would be completely incompatible with
international human rights law. Nevertheless, it has been quite routine for governments
to argue, and for courts to endorse, that section 15 imposes no positive obligations on
governments in Canada to meet even the most fundamental responsibilities under
international human rights law. Courts have agreed with respondent governments that
they are not required by section 15 to, for example, ameliorate the conditions of
134. See, for example, Masse, supra note 93 at 43: " The legislature could repeal the social assistance
statutes... s.7 does not confer any affirmative right to governmental aid."
135. On the treatment of these claims by lower courts, see, for example, Gosselin, supra note 84;
Fernandes, supra note 76; Masse, supra note 97; Clark, supra note 105. See also M. Jackman, "Poor
Rights: Using the Charter to Support Social Welfare Claims" (1993) 19 Queen's L.J. 65; B. Porter,
"The Uninvited Guests: Reflections on the Brief History of Poor People Seeking their Rightful Place
in Equality Jurisprudence" in Roads to Equality Vol. 3, (Canadian Bar Association, Continuing
Legal Education Program, Annual General Meeting, 1994).
136. Masse, ibid.
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poverty and inadequate housing in Aboriginal communities; 137 adopt human rights
legislation prohibiting discrimination; 138 provide healthcare for the sick and
infirm; 139 or ensure the provision of social assistance for single mothers and others
in need. 140
Fortunately, however, this wall separating domestic equality jurisprudence from
substantive obligations under international human rights law has now been knocked
down by the Supreme Court. In Eldridge,14 1 when deaf claimants argued that section
15 imposed an obligation on the Government of British Columbia to provide inter-
preter services so they could communicate with their doctors, provincial governments
from across Canada rallied to argue against the idea that section 15 would impose
obligations on governments to address social or economic disadvantage that exists
independently of government action. They argued that only disadvantage caused by a
discriminatory provision or action of government would fall within the ambit of
section 15 - not disadvantage that exists independently of government action, such as
the disadvantage associated with deafness. Justice La Forest, writing for a unanimous
court, condemned as "thin and impoverished" the notion of equality advanced by those
who claim that "section 15(1) does not oblige governments to implement programmes
to alleviate disadvantages that exist independently of state action." 142
As noted by the Court in Vriend 143 the "substantive" equality analysis endorsed in
Eldridge redirects the focus of inquiry from the effect of legislative distinctions to the
effects of the social realities faced by disadvantaged groups. In more traditional
discrimination claims, the equality analysis will focus on the comparison between
those who are included in legislative protections and benefits and those who are
excluded. The substantive equality analysis, however, considers the discriminatory
effect on members of disadvantaged groups of not providing the protection or benefit
they need. This failure to address a unique need or disadvantage is considered in the
context of the social realities facing disadvantaged groups in Canada. Refusing to
provide necessary funding to a programme that provides interpreter services to the
deaf and hard of hearing or failing to enact human rights protections necessary to gays
137. Lovelace v. Ontario (1997), 33 O.R. (3d) 735 (C.A.) Leave granted to Supreme Court of Canada,
S.C.C. File No. 26165. S.C.C. Bulletin, 1998, p. 224; Heard December 7, 1999. Decision not yet
released. The Ontario Court of Appeal found that limited judicial scrutiny of an ameliorative pro-
gramme designed to address the socio-economic needs of Aboriginal communities is warranted in
part because "[g]ovemments have no constitutional obligation to remedy all conditions of disadvan-
tage in our society."
138. Vriend, supra note 127 at para. 196, per Major J. (in dissent) "The issue may be that the Legislature
would prefer no human rights Act over one that includes sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of
discrimination, or the issue may be how the legislation ought to be amended to bring it into confor-
mity with the Charter. That determination is best left to the Legislature."
139. Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General) 125 D.L.R. (4th) 323 (B.C.C.A.) at 341.
140. Schachter, supra note 68 at 721-22; Masse, supra note 97.
141. Supra note 94.
142. Ibid. at 677-78.
143. Vriend, supra note 127.
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and lesbians has a discriminatory effect simply because of the unique needs of the
groups.144
In many cases, a substantive equality analysis such as this may provide a basis on
which to claim important components of social and economic rights, which similarly
oblige governments to address the needs of the most vulnerable groups, by implement-
ing programmes or legislating protections necessary to the enjoyment of dignity and
security. 145 Further, the substantive equality approach outlined by the Court in
Eldridge and Vriend is consistent with the emerging approach to equality within the
United Nations human rights treaty monitoring bodies such as CEDAW and HRC
described above. When these bodies identify the discriminatory effect on women and
children of social programme cut-backs or inadequate legislative protections in
Canada, they are engaging in precisely the kind of equality analysis endorsed by the
Supreme Court of Canada as a substantive equality approach.
Does this approach to equality mean that the courts will become policy-makers or
examine every piece of legislation or programme for adequacy? Not at all. It means
that Canadian courts, like U.N. human rights treaty monitoring bodies, can consider
the broad systemic pattern of social and economic disadvantage as being central to the
equality guarantee. Where adequate programmes or legislation are necessary for the
protection of fundamental human rights linked with dignity and personal integrity,
section 15 will require governments to meet certain substantive obligations in the
implementation of the necessary legislation and programmes. The threshold for
judicial intervention and the nature of the remedy will be derived, as in other section
15 cases, from the analysis of dignity interests and a consideration of the respective
competencies and roles of courts and legislatures.
Equality analysis that is better informed by international human rights law, however,
will be able to draw on evolving norms within international human rights defining the
scope and content of governments' obligations toward disadvantaged groups in the
social and economic domain. General Comments adopted by the CESCR, for example,
describe the obligations attached to the right to adequate housing146 and the right to
food. 147 They also identify substantive obligations linked with the protection of
dignity and equality interests of persons with disabilities 148 and older persons. 149 The
144. Ibid.
145. General Comment No. 9, supra note 66 at paras. 14, 15.
146. General Comment'No. 4, supra note 70; United Nations Economic and Social Council, Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Sixteenth Sess., 28 April - 16 May 1997, General Com-
ment No. 7: The Right to Adequate Housing (article 11.1 of the Covenant): Forced Evictions,
Geneva, 20 May 1997, E/C.12/1997/4.
147. United Nations Economic and Social Council, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Twentieth Sess., 26 April - 14 May 1999, General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food
(article 11.1), Geneva, 12 May 1999, E/C.12/1999/5.
148. United Nations Economic and Social Council, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Eleventh Sess., 38 th Mtg., 25 November 1994, General Comment No. 5 Persons With Disabilities,
Geneva 25 November 1994, EIC. 12/1994/13.
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importance of considering this evolving jurisprudence at the international level is
recognized by L'Heureux-Dub6, J. in Ewanchuk, where she relies on interpretive
comments from CEDAW in applying the Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms
of Discrimination Against Women to Charter interpretation. 150 Canadian courts can
derive considerable guidance from both the interpretive comments of U.N. human
rights treaty monitoring bodies and their specific observations on issues within
Canada. These provide a useful reference point from which Canadian courts can assess
the substantive obligations of governments toward disadvantaged groups under sec-
tion 15 of the Charter.
ii) Positive Obligations under Section 7
As L'Heureux-Dub6, J. notes in Ewanchuk,151 section 7 of the Charter will also be
important as a vehicle for the incorporation of international human rights in the
Charter. The CESCR has challenged Canadian courts to adopt a more substantive
reading of life, liberty and security of the person, and of fundamental justice to
recognize governments' positive obligations to protect social and economic interests
linked with security and integrity.
In the past, courts have tended to assume that section 7 of the Charter is primarily a
right to be free of state interference, not a right to the benefit of government action or
programmes. 152 Lamer, C.J. observed in Schachter that section 7 is generally viewed
as more of a "negative" right than section 15:
Other rights will be more in the nature of "negative" rights, which merely restrict
the government. However, even in those cases, the rights may have certain positive
aspects. For instance, the right to life, liberty and security of the person is in one
sense a negative right, but the requirement that the government respect the "funda-
mental principles of justice" may provide a basis for characterizing s.7 as a positive
right in some circumstances. 153
If the potential of section 7 to protect rights such as the right to food, clothing and
housing, referred to in Irwin Toyl 54 is to be realized, however, the positive components
of these rights must clearly achieve greater recognition.
Though in no way developing a broad, substantive reading of section 7, the Supreme
Court's recent decision in New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Ser-
vices) v. G. (J.),155 certainly rejected an exclusively "negative rights" orientation to
149. United Nations Economic and Social Council, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Thirteenth Sess., 39th Mtg., 20 November 7 8 December 1995, General Comment No. 6 The Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights of Older Persons, Geneva, 24 November 1995, E/1996/22 as
reported in (1996) 3:2 I.H.R.R. at 253.
150. Ewanchuk, supra note 114 at para. 71.
151. Ibid. at para. 73.
152. See, for example, Masse, supra note 97 at 42.
153. Schachter, supra note 68 at 702.
154. Supra note73.
155. Supra note 107.
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section 7 and affirmed that this section, like section 15, places positive as well as
negative obligations on the state. In that case the Supreme Court overturned the
majority decision of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal, which had dismissed a
section 7 challenge to the denial of funding for legal aid in child custody proceedings.
As noted above, this had been one of the decisions which caused concern at the
CESCR.156 The majority of the Court of Appeal had rejected the section 7 claim on
the basis that "it is [not] the responsibility of the courts to effectively create pro-
grammes designed to further social justice and equality ... "157
Lamer, C.J., writing for the majority, rejected the view that section 7 only protects
negative rights to be free of state interference. He distinguished his earlier decision in
Prosper,158 in which he had rejected the notion of a positive obligation on govern-
ments to provide duty counsel under section 10 of the Charter. 159 According to Lamer
C.J., the earlier decision "does not preclude an interpretation of s. 7 that imposes a
positive constitutional obligation on governments to provide counsel in those cases
when it is necessary to ensure a fair hearing."16 0 Rather than invoking the allocation
of financial resources as a reason for excluding this type of positive rights claim from
the scope of section 7, as had been done by the Court below (relying on Prosper)
Lamer, C.J. addressed the financial issues under section 1, finding that an estimated
cost of less than $100,000 of providing state-funded counsel in these circumstances
"is insufficient to constitute a justification within the meaning of s. 1' ' 161
It is noteworthy that Bastarache J., who had to recluse himself from the hearing of
G.(J.) at the Supreme Court, had written an eloquent dissent in the Court of Appeal
decision prior to his appointment to the Supreme Court, in which he invoked social
and economic rights under international human rights law as providing the basis for
a more substantive reading of section 7:
I believe, however, that the policy of human rights has evolved internationally and
domestically and that both the protective and integrative functions of human rights
must be constitutionally accepted under the Charter. (See: John D. Whyte, Funda-
mental Justice: The Scope and Application of Section 7 of the Charter (1983), 13
Man. L.J. 455, at p. 462.) In modem societies, rights cannot be fully protected by
preventing government intrusions in the lives of citizens. Some rights in effect
require governmental action for their integration into the concept of fundamental
justice. It is also important to look at individual international instruments with
regard to the text of companion instruments. While article 9(1) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights seems to limit "liberty",and "security" to
156. See supra, text accompanying note 108.
157. New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G.(J.) (1997), 145 D.L.R. (4th) 349
(N.B.C.A.) at 356, adopting the words of Creaghan J. in R. v. Cormier (1988), 90 N.B.R. (2d) 265
(QB) at 270.
158. R. v. Prosper, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 236.
159. Ibid. at 266-67.
160. G.(J.), supra note 107 at para. 107.
161. Ibid. at para. 100.
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their physical aspect, for instance, article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, 1948 G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 speaks of "the right to security
in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age and other
lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond [one's] control" (my emphasis).
The Charter must limit the intrusion of the state in the lives of its citizens; it must
also mandate its function in those limited cases where individuals can make legiti-
mate claims against it in the name of liberty and human dignity." 162
The door to a substantive reading of section 7 of the sort envisaged by Bastarache, J.,
acting as a vehicle through which to give domestic effect to many of the rights under
the ICESCR, is thus still open. A "broad and purposive reading" of section 7, as
recommended by the CESCR, would complement the substantive approach to equality
already affirmed by the Supreme Court, capturing the interdependence of equality,
dignity and security issues and of international and domestic human rights. Sections
7 and 15 combined would go a long way in addressing the need to provide, through
consistent interpretation of the Charter, effective remedies to violations of fundamen-
tal human rights linked with poverty.
Would a recognition of positive obligations under section 7 demand judicial interven-
tion in all manner of policy choices? Not at all. As with a substantive approach to
equality, it would simply ensure that courts intervene in "those limited cases" when,
as Bastarache, J. put it, "individuals can make legitimate claims against it [the state]
in the name of liberty and human dignity." 163 Bastarache J. clearly envisages interna-
tional human rights law as providing essential guidance as to the normative content
of governments' obligations. As in section 15 jurisprudence, evolving international
human rights norms, assessed in the context of competing needs and available
resources, would provide Canadian courts with appropriate guidelines as to the line
between policy choices and violations of the right to life, liberty and security of the
person.
C. Judicial Competence in the Social and Economic Realm
As noted above, most courts which have rejected poverty related claims under the
Charter have relied on Justice La Forest's statement in Andrews that "[m]uch eco-
nomic and social policy-making is simply beyond the institutional competence of the
courts." The New Brunswick Court of Appeal in G.(J.) relied further on Justice La
Forest's dissent in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v Canada (A.G.), 164 in which he wrote that:
Courts are specialists in the interpretation of legislation and are, accordingly, well
placed to subject criminal justice legislation to careful scrutiny. However, courts are
not specialists in the realm of policy-making, nor should they be. This is a role
properly assigned to the elected representatives of the peoples, who have at their
disposal the necessary institutional resources to enable them to compile and assess
162. Supra note 157 at 366.
163. Ibid.
164. RJR-MacDonald Inc. v Canada (A.G.), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 [hereinafter RJR-MacDonald].
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social science evidence, to mediate between competing interests and to reach out
and protect vulnerable groups. 165
These comments, of course, need to be understood in the context of considering the
rights of a tobacco company, not fundamental social rights of the poor.166 It is clear from
the position which Justice La Forest adopts in other cases, most notably in Eldridge, that
his cautions about judicial competence ought not to be taken as a reason for rejecting the
human rights claims of the most disadvantaged groups in the social and economic domain.
Nevertheless, judicial musings about the relative incompetence of courts in comparison
to elected representatives who "compile and assess social science evidence" and "reach
out to protect vulnerable groups" have frequently been invoked by lower courts as a reason
to refuse to protect the most fundamental rights of poor people.167
Assertions of incompetence in the social and economic field, however, have been made
and repeated by lower courts with little examination in specific contexts. For instance,
it is difficult to credit the suggestion that social science evidence is so difficult as to
be beyond judicial competency where fundamental rights rather than policy-making
choices are at issue. Courts deal with social science evidence all the time. The court
in Masse, in fact, had no difficulty in assessing social science evidence as to the effect
of the welfare cuts. The court found, as did the CESCR subsequently, that the cuts
would force many families out of their homes and some into homelessness. 168 This
type of social science evidence is no more difficult for the courts to deal with than
issues that arise in the criminal context, such as complex DNA evidence or the child
psychology needed to deal with children witnesses who have been victims of sexual
abuse. These are not areas in which judges had obvious expertise, and nor need they
have. Their role is to hold fair hearings and to consider the evidence, not to use any
inherent expertise in the issues before them.
It is important to be clear about what claimants of social and economic rights are
actually asking courts to do before declaring courts incompetent to do it. The court in
Masse was asked, first, to assess social science evidence as to the anticipated effects
of the welfare cuts. Evidence was presented that the cuts would, among other things,
force households from their homes and deprive them of sufficient income to provide
for adequate food and nutrition. The court considered this evidence and found that it
was credible. It found that many recipients would have to leave their present homes
and some would become homeless. The claimants then asked the court to consider
whether government action creating these effects was in violation of their constitu-
tional rights. The claimants asked that their Charter rights to equality and security of
the person be interpreted consistently with international human rights law.
165. Ibid. at para. 68.
166. See M. Jackman, "Protecting Rights and Promoting Democracy: Judicial Review Under Section 1 of
the Charter" (1996) 34 Osgoode Hall L.J. 661.
167. W. Mackay, T. Piper and N. Kim, "Social Condition as a Prohibited Ground of Discrimination
Under the Canadian Human Rights Act" (Submitted to the Canadian Human Rights Act Review
Panel, December, 1999) at 33-46.
168. Concluding Observations, CESCR, 1998, supra note 43 at para. 21.
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Assessing whether these documented effects infringe on constitutional rights and
interpreting these rights in line with international human rights law surely engages an
area of judicial, not legislative competence. Poor people such as the claimants in Masse
do not advance rights claims under the Charter on the assumption that courts are
experts in social policy and on that account ought to redesign programmes. Rather,
they seek from courts adjudication of constitutional rights, informed by the principles
of Charter interpretation affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada.
Unfortunately, lower courts have premised their assessments of these constitutional
claims linked with poverty on the idea that social and economic rights are not
fundamental human rights, not subject to adjudication and remedy, and therefore not
within the competency of courts. Poor peoples' constitutional claims to dignity,
equality and security are mistaken for demands that judges "make policy" simply
because these rights are interdependent with and indivisible from the right to an
adequate standard of living. Examined more closely, however, these claims are really
only demands that Charter rights be adjudicated in the social and economic domain
in the same way as they are adjudicated in other areas.
Without underestimating problems of social or class bias confronting poor people
claiming their Charter rights in court, the opportunity to address poverty issues in a
public forum, to have stories told and heard, often for the first time, to have relevant
evidence disclosed, put on the record and examined, and to have submissions heard
as to the interpretation and application of universal principles of law to specific issues
in the lives of poor people - these participatory rights which transformed the review
process at the CESCR are seen as all-important to a constituency that has previously
been excluded from the human rights movement in Canada. As Frank Michelman
suggests, courts may "enjoy a situational advantage over the people at large in listening
for voices from the margins."169 The guarantee of a hearing and the protections of
procedural fairness are taken for granted by constituencies that have had their human
rights protected as "first generation rights;" yet they are new and empowering to poor
people who have been denied access to rights claiming processes in the past.
There is no question that remedies to violations of social and economic rights may
frequently require the legislature or executive to implement or alter programmes, or
to adopt new regulatory or legislative measures. These types of remedies fall in the
legislative rather than the judicial sphere of competence. But this fact does not warrant
the kind of abandonment of the social and economic sphere and problems linked with
poverty that has been seen at the lower court level in Canada. Rather, it requires a
more flexible approach to Charter remedies.
The Supreme Court has appropriately preferred to exercise deference at the remedial
stage in these types of cases rather than abdicate from any judicial role simply because
substantive Charter claims may engage issues of programme implementation or
legislative duties. In Eldridge, for example, the Court recognized that legislatures
ought to be given "wide latitude in the allocation of resources". 170 But this did not
169. F. Michelman, "Law's Republic" (1988) 97 Yale L.J. 1493 at 1537.
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mean dismissing an equality claim simply because the remedy required would involve
the implementation of a programme or the allocation of resources. The Court simply
rendered its decision on the "rights" issues and left the "policy-making" to the
government. It recognized that there were "myriad options available to the government
that may rectify the unconstitutionality of the current system." The Court declared the
government's constitutional responsibility to ensure that sign language interpreters
will be provided where necessary for effective communication in the delivery of
medical services, by whatever means it considers most appropriate. 171
As Craig Scott and Patrick Macklem note with respect to the Supreme Court's decision
in Schachter, courts must respond to their new constitutional responsibility through a
combination of creating competence where needed and deference to legislatures where
appropriate:
[I]nstitutional competence is first and foremost subservient to and conditioned by a
commitment to the fundamental values that underlie constitutional rights. Courts
create their own competence. The courage to be creative depends on a conviction
that the values at stake are legitimate concerns for the judiciary. When the desirabil-
ity of recognizing such values nonetheless conflicts with perceived institutional
inadequacies, the judiciary need not absolve itself of the issue. Instead, it is free to
provide an interpretation and a remedy as best as it can do in the circumstances, and
hope to provoke a cooperative and constructive dialogue with other organs of gov-
emnment and the citizenry at large. 172
Remedies to violations of social and economic rights in the context of Canadian
federalism will frequently involve more than one level of government. A number of
violations that have been identified at the international level have themselves been the
result of inter-governmental agreements and the recommended remedies require that
various levels of government in Canada work together to achieve compliance.173 In
these instances, courts would need to give governments time to negotiate new arrange-
ments and agreements to achieve compliance with substantive obligations under the
Charter and international human rights law.
A recent decision under the social and economic rights provisions of the Constitution
of the Republic of South Africa 174 provides a useful model of a flexible approach to
remedies that can be adopted in relation to substantive Charter claims linked with
170. Eldridge, supra note 94 at para. 85.
171. Eldridge, supra note 94 at 631-32.
172. C. Scott and P. Macklem, supra note 38 at 35-36.
173. For example, the National Child Benefit clawback, identified by both the CESCR and the HRC
as discriminatory, is a result of a federal/provincial agreement which would need to be renegoti-
ated to remedy the violation. See Federal/Provincial/Territorial Ministers Responsible for Social
Services, NCB Governance and Accountability Framework, online: <http://socialunion.gc.ca/
ncb/geston3__e.html>; Federal-Provincial-Territorial Meeting of Ministers Responsible for Social Ser-
vices, The National Child Benefit-Building a Better Future for Canadian Children, Document:
830-594/013, September 1997.
174. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, Act 108 of 1996 at ss. 26 and 28.
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social and economic rights in Canada. The High Court of South Africa in Grootboom
v Oostenberg Municipality'75 considered a claim by a group of 390 adults and 510
children forced to camp at a sportsfield without tents or facilities after having been
forced to vacate a squatter settlement. The homeless families initiated a claim against
all relevant governments, from local to national, alleging violation of their right to
adequate housing, as protected by s. 26 of the South African Constitution or, alterna-
tively, violation of the children's right to basic shelter, as protected by s. 28 of that
Constitution. The Court was not prepared to find for the group under s. 26 because the
governments could show, according to the Court, that in the context of scarce resources
and competing needs, it had taken "reasonable legislative and other measures, within
its available resources, to achieve a progressive realisation of this right."
On the other hand, the Court was prepared to accept the claim under s. 28 because that
section established a right of every child to basic nutrition, shelter, health care services
and social services and was not expressed to be subject to the "progressive realization"
provision. Like Canadian courts, however, the Court was concerned not to intrude
upon the responsibility and functions of the various levels of government concerned,
nor to pre-empt the development of an appropriate remedy. It declared that the various
levels of government were jointly responsible for a violation of the children's right to
basic shelter and outlined certain minimum requirements that needed to be met. It
further ordered that the governments report back to the court on matters of imple-
mentation within three months, that the applicants then have a further month to
comment on the report, followed by a reply from the governments. Only then, if
necessary, would the Court make a further remedial order.
The express inclusion of justiciable social and economic rights in their Constitution
has not, therefore, led South African courts to take over the social policy function of
government. Rather, they have begun to adopt flexible and creative approaches to
remedy, recognizing that various governments need to work together to achieve
compliance with social and economic rights, and need to be given appropriate time to
develop policy responses to judicial rulings. At the same time the Court recognized,
in Grootboom, the importance of ensuring the participation of affected constituencies
in the development of an appropriate remedy. These are precisely the types of
approaches which Canadian courts ought to take, along the model of the Eldridge
decision, in order to recognize the respective competencies of courts and legislatures
while safeguarding the rights of vulnerable groups in critical areas linked with
equality, security and dignity in the' social and economic domain.
D. Respect for the Policy-Making Role of Legislatures
Closely related to the question of relative competence of courts and legislatures is the
question of the "legitimate" role of legislatures in making policy. Poor peoples'
Charter claims are frequently considered demands that courts take over policy-mak-
ing. The underlying premise of such statements, however, is simply that social and
175. (17 December, 1999) 6826/99 (High Court of South Africa, Cape of Good Hope Provincial Divi-
sion).
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economic rights such as the right to an adequate standard of living are not rights at
all, but policy issues. What is needed, of course, is a clearer distinction between
"policy making", which is what legislatures ought to do, and "rights adjudicating",
which is what courts ought to do. Rather than relegate the entire social and economic
sphere to "policy-making", it makes more sense to delineate the respective responsi-
bilities of legislatures and courts in this as in other areas through the recognition of
the courts' proper role in upholding fundamental rights.
The Supreme Court has made it clear in recent decisions that courts cannot simply
abandon their constitutional responsibility when Charter rights claims engage more
complex issues of social policy. As McLachlin J, writing in RJR-MacDonald, stated:
Parliament has its role: to choose the appropriate response to social problems within
the limiting framework of the constitution. But the courts also have a role to deter-
mine, objectively and impartially, whether Parliament's choice falls within the lim-
iting framework of the constitution. The courts are no more permitted to abdicate
their responsibility than is Parliament. To carry judicial deference to the point of
accepting Parliament's view simply on the basis that the problem is serious and the
solution difficult, would be to diminish the role of the courts in the constitutional
process and to weaken the structure of rights upon which our constitution and our
nation is founded. 176
As stated by Iacobucci, J. in Vriend, a "social contract" was created with the Charter
which gave a new role and responsibility to the courts. The oft cited critique that courts
are wrongfully usurping the role of the legislatures "misunderstands what took place
and what was intended when our country adopted the Charter in 1981-82." 177 Judicial
interventions in defence of democratic values and principles are what the new judicial
role is all about:
Democratic values and principles under the Charter demand that legislators and the
executive take these into account; and if they fail to do so, courts should stand ready
to intervene to protect these democratic values as appropriate. As others have so
forcefully stated, judges are not acting undemocratically by intervening when there
are indications that a legislative or executive decision was not reached in accor-
dance with the democratic principles mandated by the Charter.178
As Chief Justice Dickson affirmed in Slaight Communications, international human
rights "reflect the values and principles that underlie the Charter itself." 179 Our
judicial culture which is more at home with civil and political rights, however, has too
often ignored the important role of international human rights in guiding courts in their
determination of the fundamental Charter values in the social and economic domain.
176. RJR-MacDonald, supra note 164 at para. 136.
177. Vriend, supra note 127 at para. 130, per lacobucci J.
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Judging Poverty
CONCLUSION
The lower court decisions which have expunged poverty issues from the scope of
Charter protections have simply misapplied and misinterpreted Justice La Forest's
statement in Andrews. Admonishing courts not to second-guess legislative policy
choices in the social and economic realm, Justice La Forest did not suggest that there
are no fundamental values or human rights issues at stake in the social and economic
domain. Rather, he distinguished the appropriate role of courts in protecting "funda-
mental values" from the inappropriate use of the Charter as a "tool for the wholesale
subjection to judicial scrutiny of variegated legislative choices in no way infringing
on values fundamental to a free and democratic society." 180
Legislative choices which deprive vulnerable groups of access to adequate food,
clothing and housing clearly infringe on fundamental Charter values. The right to an
adequate standard of living and other social and economic rights are central to what
Chief Justice Dickson described as "the values and principles that underlie the Charter
itself."18 1 It is simply no longer tenable, given the emerging consensus at the interna-
tional level about the nature of the most fundamental human rights violations in
Canada, to hold that legislative choices linked with poverty, homelessness and hunger
have not engaged fundamental democratic values.
The recent decision in Baker182 suggests that international human rights law will be
a "critical influence" in distinguishing issues of fundamental human rights from areas
of legitimate policy choice. And the CESCR has made it clear that the right to an
adequate standard of living and other social and economic rights cannot be down-
graded to mere policy objectives. Poverty among vulnerable groups engages "funda-
mental democratic values" and human rights. There is a critical role for the courts in
applying the Charter appropriately in the social and economic domain so as to address
these critical violations of fundamental human rights.
The adoption of a rigid classification of economic, social and cultural rights which
puts them, by definition, beyond the reach of the courts would thus be arbitrary and
incompatible with the principle that the two sets of human rights are indivisible and
interdependent. It would also drastically curtail the capacity of the courts to protect
the rights of the most vulnerable and disadvantaged groups in society. 183
For poor people, the recognition of social and economic rights as components of
Charter rights to dignity, equality and security is a prerequisite for their acceptance
as full and equal participants in the human rights movement and in democratic
institutions in Canada. 18 4 The challenge emerging from the U.N. treaty monitoring
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bodies is not so much for judges to be "creative" about reading social and economic
rights into the Charter as it isfor them to stop reading out of the Charter poor peoples'
legitimate rights to security and dignity. The interdependence and indivisibility of
social and economic rights with civil and political rights means that if domestic courts
downgrade social and economic rights to unenforceable policy objectives, the equality
and security interests of the most vulnerable groups will be unfairly denied the
protection Charter guarantees. 185
Giving appropriate recognition to poor peoples'claims to dignity, equality and security
and infusing Charter interpretation with evolving international human rights norms
does not require courts to throw aside concerns about judicial deference to the role
and competence of legislatures. It is important to appreciate Justice L'Heureux-Dub6's
use of the word "scope" of the Charter's protections. Ensuring that international
human rights law is a critical influence in determining the "scope" of the rights in the
Charter does not mean dramatically expanding the role of the judiciary or encroaching
on the policy making function of legislatures. In its classical use, the idea of interpre-
tive "scope" was used to describe the navigational aim or sight of textual interpretation
which would ensure that the elaborated meaning of a text remains true to its central
purpose. 186 For the social and economic rights protected in international human rights
law to become a critical influence in determining the "scope" of Charter rights, the
courts need not expand the ambit of the rights protected or extend the role of the
judiciary into policy-making. Rather, they need simply to refine the "sight" or
orientation of Charter interpretation around its central purpose.
Referencing Charter interpretation to social and economic rights and other substantive
obligations under international human rights law will assist the courts in identifying
and protecting the values fundamental to a free and democratic society. At the same
time, this new reference point will help human rights advocates, human rights insti-
tutions, social justice advocates, politicians and the media rethink the distinction
between human rights and social policy in order to bring the most critical issues of
human rights more clearly into focus. We all need to think again about rights and
politics in Canada to ensure a fair hearing for those whose fundamental human rights
are being violated by poverty and homelessness.
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